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Abstract 
 
Although refugees and registered asylum-seekers have a legal right to work in South 
Africa, research shows that prevailing anti-immigrant attitudes and suspicion of these 
documents by South African employers makes employment extraordinarily difficult to 
acquire. Drawing from literature on both South Africa’s refugee rights policies and its 
informal sector, this thesis investigates how in the face of such challenges, forced 
migrants in Cape Town secure their day-to-day livelihoods. The research is based on 
semi-structured, open-ended interviews with thirty-two refugees and other forced 
migrants who live and operate in the Cape Town area, as well as five key informant 
interviews with employees of refugee service organizations.   The research finds that in 
order to even survive, participants must use a wide ‘portfolio’ of tactics – including 
moving between the formal and informal sectors, and drawing upon ethnic and 
community connections in order to locate work and gain a toehold in the South African 
economy.  
 
Keywords: asylum seeker, Cape Town, entrepreneurship, forced migrant, informal 
economy, livelihood, migration, refugee, South Africa, xenophobia 
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CHAPTER ONE: INTRODUCTION AND BACKGROUND 
 
‘The future of the world is unquestionably urban, and the trajectory of 
displacement is moving in the same direction’ - Jacobsen, 2005, 40. 
  
1.1. Introduction  
This research focuses on the livelihoods of forced migrants working outside the 
framework of formal employment. In an effort to understand the complex ways that 
these forced migrants meet their daily needs, two linked questions guided my 
interviewing and analysis: First, what forms of employment or other income-generating 
activities do those engaged in the informal sector use to secure their livelihoods? And 
second, what are the economic, social and spatial factors that enable this employment?  
 
It is important to explain two key terms at the outset. First, I employ the term ‘forced 
migrant’ in lieu of the much tidier ‘refugee’. The reasoning for this is more fully 
explained in sections 1.6, but briefly, the definition of a ‘refugee’ has become a static, 
and out-dated term, which, particularly in the South African context, excludes those 
migrants, who, though forcibly displaced, may not be able to access or obtain asylum 
seeker or refugee status. Therefore, I employ the term ‘forced migrant’ rather than 
‘refugee’ to reflect a diverse set of migrants that includes asylum seekers, refugees, 
those registered as visitors or using a ZDP1 and those without legal documentation. 
Secondly, I employ the term ‘informal labourers’ to refer to individuals that are engaged 
in unstable work, whether as casual labourers without a formal contract, or as self-
employed entrepreneurs. 
 
                                                          
1
 The ZDP permit lasted for four years (2010-2014), and was meant to regularize the 
status of Zimbabweans living in South Africa either illegally, or as asylum seekers. It 
provides permit holders with the right to live, work and study in South Africa. 
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Although current South African legislation reflects a refugee policy that includes legally 
recognized refugees as equal stakeholders in South African society, lack of access to the 
Department of Home Affairs to apply for refugee status, difficulty in accessing South 
Africa’s banking system and the perception that foreigners ‘steal jobs’ ensure that in 
practice, many forced migrants, including legally recognized refugees, experience 
difficulty finding employment in the formal economy (CoRMSA, 2009; Landau, 2009; 
Mawadza 2008; Polzer & Landau 2008). This inability to access employment in the 
formal labour market drives many into the informal economy (Smit & Rugunanan, 
2014). Perhaps in reaction to this, participants engage in a kind of ‘identity economics’ 
(Meagher, 2010), drawing upon shared nationality and ethnicity to access job 
opportunities, loans, and shared housing. It is this social connection to others, more than 
income, previous employment or skills, which helps to afford some measure of 
protection to the research participants from the financial and social uncertainty that 
governs their existence.  
 
1.2 Context 
Despite the majority of displaced people worldwide living in urban areas (Jacobsen, 
2005), academic literature considering refugees in Africa focuses disproportionately on 
those living in formal camps (Bakewell, 2008; Gladden, 2012).  However, unlike many 
other countries in Africa, South Africa contains no refugee camps. This makes all 
refugees in the country de facto ‘urban refugees’, many of whom find themselves in 
complex urban environments like Johannesburg and Cape Town (Vearey, 2008). While 
obtaining exact numbers for forced migrants is a difficult and politically complicated 
matter (Jacobsen, 2006) South Africa is host to one of the largest populations of asylum 
seekers in the world, with the UNHCR estimating that 243, 948 asylum seekers, and 65, 
668 refugees currently reside in South Africa (2014). While refugees living in camps 
are forced to rely on humanitarian relief (Wagacha & Guiney, 2008), displaced persons 
living in South Africa are expected to become self-sufficient by integrating with their 
host population and earning a living (Landau, 2006).  
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 Within the literature surrounding forced migration, scholars alternate between two 
positions: that forced migrants are vulnerable individuals in need of social support (c.f 
Rolfe et al, 1987); and, more currently, a guarded suggestion that urban and self-settled 
forced migrants are resilient economic actors, capable of securing their own livelihoods, 
without the support of host country and international aid (Jacobsen, 2005; Horst 2006; 
Campbell et al, 2006; Omata, 2013). With these two perspectives as my guideposts, I 
set out to discover how those forced migrants deriving their incomes outside of the 
formal sector were faring in the Cape Town economy. 
1.3 The Livelihoods Approach 
 In order to do this, I used the ‘livelihoods approach’. With roots stretching back to the 
1960s, this framework has been described as ‘people centred, non-sectoral and 
grounded in the multidimensional reality of daily life’ (Kaag, 2004: 1). One of the 
earliest uses of the term ‘livelihood’ was by Evans-Pritchard in his ethnographic 
investigations of the Nuer and the ways in which they made a living in the Nile Valley 
(1940). The foundation of the livelihoods approach was laid by the economist Karl 
Polanyi in his books The Great Transformation (1944) and The Livelihood of Man 
(1977)2, wherein he proposed a break from mainstream, formalist economics towards 
substantivism, a view which took a human-centred approach towards economics, and 
which recognized the social, cultural and historical embedded-ness of how individuals 
secure their living.  
By the 1980s, the livelihoods approach was an idea whose time had come. As Structural 
Adjustment Programs grew to prominence in 1980s in mainstream economic 
development thinking, Polanyi’s ideas converged with growing calls amongst policy 
makers and academics for a bottom-up and actor-oriented approach to development. 
Throughout the 1980s, as Robert Chambers began pioneering the livelihoods approach 
(Chambers, 1987; Chambers & Conway, 1992), economists turned their attentions to 
                                                          
2
 Published posthumously  
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the survival strategies of the poor as well as the informal economy (Schmink, 1984). 
The economist and philosopher Amartya Sen proposed considering actors’ societal 
entitlements, rather than just their property, as a way of understanding poverty (1981).  
Sen’s later focus on capabilities (1985) as a way of paying attention to what a person is 
capable of doing, and their own perceptions of what is desirable, joined with James C. 
Scott’s analysis of Malaysian peasants’ resistance to dominance through techniques of 
evasion (1985), further set the groundwork for an actor-centred livelihoods approach 
that highlights the diversity and multidimensionality of lived poverty.    
 
With its focus on both individual strategies and structural influence, this framework 
lends itself well to considering the livelihood strategies of forced migrants who operate 
within a defined legal framework.  When writing about livelihoods in the refugee 
context, Jacobsen defines this livelihood framework as: 
 … a consideration of the assets and strategies refugees use to achieve desired 
outcomes, and the institutional or structural context…processes, institutions and 
policies which constrains or enables access to these assets and strategies 
(Jacobsen, 2006: 279).  
Consideration of the institutional context in South Africa is particularly relevant, as 
many migrants have difficulty accessing formal employment (Landau, 2007), and their 
tendency to work in the informal sector has been linked to their difficulty in accessing 
proper documentation (Crush, William & Peberdy, 2005; Landau, 2006). These issues 
of access to formal employment and documentation, and the significant effect they have 
on participants’ livelihoods, is considered in Chapter 3.   
Although refugees ‘enjoy an independent legal personality’ from other migrants (Feller, 
2005: 27), in South Africa, given the difficulty of distinguishing between voluntary and 
forced migrants, discussions of refugees and forced migrants in existing research on 
migration in South Africa tend to be subsumed within a broader analysis of migrants in 
general (Friebel, Gallego & Mendola, 2013; Hunter & Skinner, 2003; Landau & Wa 
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Kabwe Segatti, 2009; Vearey, 2008).  This thesis uses the livelihoods framework to 
consider the experiences of forced migrants, as distinct from migrants as a broad 
category. The livelihoods approach has been successfully applied in previous research 
to examine the specific social, economic and policy contexts in which migrants and 
refugees pursue their livelihoods in South Africa (De Vriese, 2006; Jacobsen, 2006; 
Vearey 2008). My research on forced migrants in South Africa continues in the same 
vein as these scholars, but focuses on the city of Cape Town, in the Western Cape, 
rather than Johannesburg in Gauteng Province.  
1.4 Research Methodology 
Data was collected in the course of four months spent in Cape Town, between mid-May 
and mid-September of 2013. In total, I conducted 37 interviews. Four of these were key 
informant interviews with staff at the following refugee service organizations: the 
African Disabled Refugee Organization (ADRO); the Agency for Refugee Education, 
Skills Training and Advocacy (ARESTA); the International Organization for Migration 
(IOM); and UCT’s Refugee Rights Unit (RRU). A further key informant interview was 
conducted with the Director of Fundi, a not-for-profit labour placement organization. 
 
Most importantly, I conducted 32 semi-structured interviews with forced migrants 
living and working in the informal sector in the Cape Town area. Participants came 
from Malawi (1), Nigeria (2), Republic of Congo (2), Somalia (4), Zimbabwe (5), and 
Democratic Republic of Congo (18).  Despite my best attempts to sample participants 
from a variety of countries of origin and forms of employment, my participants skew 
heavily towards the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC). This is due to DRCs 
significant representation amongst forced migrants in the Cape Town area. In order to 
make a gendered analysis possible, I made every effort to have an equal gender split 
amongst participants. For reasons I will discuss in later chapters, it was more difficult to 
find women respondents, and so I was only able to formally interview 13 women for 
this research. Consideration of gender, and how it shapes livelihood choices and 
practices, is nevertheless a foundational concept of this thesis.  
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These interviews took me all over the Greater Cape Town area, from Bellville to 
Simon’s Town and Athlone. While I sometimes interviewed participants as they 
worked, more often we would meet in a café over a cup of coffee to discuss migration 
histories, communities both in Cape Town and internationally, and their hopes and 
dreams for the future. I was occasionally invited into people’s homes, either to share a 
meal or simply visit. These moments, when the recorder was not on or even present, 
often led to deeper insight into how participants were patching together their 
livelihoods.  This accords with the feminist tradition that holds that equality, and even 
friendship, between interviewers and interviewees can increase trust and lead to more 
candid interactions (Kihato, 2013). The methods and tools of analysis used throughout 
the thesis will be discussed in greater detail in the following chapter.  
1.5 Structure of the Thesis  
The remainder of this chapter sets out some definitions and concepts that are drawn 
upon throughout this thesis. Following this introductory chapter and the description of 
methodology, Chapter 3 addresses the role of state structures and formal financial 
institutions in the livelihoods of Cape Town’s forced migrants, particularly with respect 
to South Africa’s migration regime. It delves into the nuts and bolts of the asylum 
seeker application and renewal process, and how this affects forced migrants’ access to 
formal banking. The chapter demonstrates that, in addition to generally lowering forced 
migrants’ quality of life, several structural changes to the asylum seeking process have 
severely frustrated forced migrants’ abilities to sustain a livelihood and maintain 
financial stability.  
 
Chapter 4 is devoted to detailing the kinds of employment forced migrants in Cape 
Town engage in. Drawing from life histories of participants, it teases apart the 
dichotomy between the formal and informal economy, in order to illustrate that 
successful forced migrants draw on opportunities from both sectors in order to gain 
financial stability.  The chapter also highlights how country of origin, gender, and 
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previous education and skills have an impact on forced migrants’ abilities to find and 
manage work in their host city.  
 
Chapter 5 discusses the non-income related livelihood strategies of forced migrants. 
This is divided into two parts. The first section focuses on the roles of community 
organizations, which offer a semi-formal support network to many forced migrants. In 
the second section, I focus on individual coping strategies, and draw forward the theme 
of heterogeneous experiences and the concept of ‘portfolios’ in order to understand how 
some participants were able to stabilize their financial position, despite fluctuating 
incomes, while others continued to struggle. 
 
In Chapter 6, my concluding chapter, I discuss the results as a whole in terms of the 
wider literature around forced migrants living in South Africa, highlighting some of my 
key findings, and drawing together some of the recurring themes. This chapter will also 
discuss the contributions that this thesis has made to the study of migration, and present 
areas for future research.  
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1.6 Background and Context  
1.6.1 Definitions and Terminology 
As an initial step, the meaning of various terms, such as forced migrant, asylum seeker, 
failed claimant, Convention refugee and urban refugee, must be clarified. Most broadly, 
a forced migrant is an individual who is engaged in movements that are ‘unplanned and 
unexpected’ but who will not necessarily be officially recognized as a refugee 
(Marfleet, 2007). The most widely cited definition of a refugee is the definition 
contained in the 1951 Geneva Convention, which states that a refugee is a person who: 
[. . .] owing to a well-founded fear of being persecuted for reasons of race, 
religion, nationality, membership of a particular social group or political 
opinion, is outside the country of his nationality and is unable to, or, owing to 
such fear, is unwilling to avail himself of the protection of that country. (Article 
1) 
While procedures vary from country to country, forced migrants who choose to make a 
claim for asylum in a country under the 1951 Geneva Convention are called ‘asylum 
seekers’. Those asylum seekers whose claims are heard and rejected are called ‘failed 
claimants’ and only those who made a claim and are found to meet the criteria of the 
Geneva Convention are accepted as ‘Convention Refugees’ (Castles & Miller, 2009). 
While such distinctions may seem unnecessary, such classifications represent how the 
process of migration is becoming ever more complex, while at the same time 
demonstrates the international refugee regime’s attempts to manage newly complicated 
streams of migration (Zetter, 2007). Indeed, each category of migrant comes with a 
unique set of rights, and a different relationship between the individual and the state. 
Overall, the bulk of the literature on displaced persons tends to focus on refugees, and 
within this, the majority of analysis restricts itself to those refugees living in 
internationally-run, United Nations-appointed refugee camps (Gladden, 2012) Those 
refugees who live outside of camps are described as urban refugees, and are the focus 
of this investigation. 
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1.6.2 Research Site: Cape Town   
Like many cities worldwide, 
Cape Town has experienced 
extraordinary population 
growth in the past six 
decades, increasing from a 
population of just over 630, 
000 in 1951 to 3.7 million in 
2010 (Quick, 1995; City of 
Cape Town, 2010). All poor 
newcomers to Cape Town, 
whether forced migrants 
arriving from other parts of 
the continent, or South 
African migrants from other 
parts of the country, must 
contend with the city’s long 
history of economic, spatial 
and racial inequality and 
injustice. In Cape Town, 
South Africa’s apartheid-era 
social planning and the 
city’s own mountainous 
geography and particular 
demography have together 
produced a hyper-segregated city (Western, 1996). Indeed, although Cape Town’s 
economy is varied and growing, much of the wealth continues to be concentrated in the 
wealthy and historically white northern and southern suburbs (de Swardt et al, 2005). 
Parts of Cape Town, such as Camps Bay and Constantia, are overtly wealthy, with ice-
Figure 1: Map of Cape Town, from McDonald, 2014: 152.  
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cream shops, luxury hotels and fine restaurants. By contrast, Cape Town’s townships3 
and informal settlements, located in the marshy, undesirable land of the Cape Flats, are 
impoverished, with high unemployment, poor service delivery, and the highest murder 
rates in South Africa (Lancaster, 2013).  
 
While the end of apartheid and the beginning of universal suffrage marked a hopeful 
time in history, inequality and segregation have in fact worsened since 1994, leaving 
South Africa with the highest income inequality in the world (McDonald, 2014: 148). 
Wealth disparity between different racial categorizations persists – with the median 
income of a white South African being approximately 5.2 times that of a coloured South 
African4, and 11.4 times as much as a black South African (Liebbrandt et al, 2012).  
This has serious implications for Cape Town, where less than a third of residents are 
black African, half are coloured, and a full 20 percent are white. This is dramatically 
different from national demographics, where 80 percent of South Africans are black. 
This, along with racially segregated median incomes, has contributed to Cape Town 
being identified as the most unequal city in the world (McDonald, 2008).   
 
In Cape Town’s townships and informal settlements, jobs are scarce, and service 
delivery is poor. For those South Africans living in townships, mainly black and 
coloured, securing their own livelihoods is difficult enough, and leads many of them 
into the informal and survival sectors (de Swardt et al, 2005). The influx of migrants, in 
                                                          
3
 In the South African context, township or location refers to the settlement areas found 
on the outskirts of urban agglomerations. Created in the apartheid era to segregate non-
white labour, townships continue today to house the majority of South Africa’s poor 
black population. 
4Prior to majority rule in South Africa, segregation was divided into four categories, that 
is white, Asiatic/Indian, Coloured and African. The term ‘Coloured’ is used in this 
sense to refer to South Africans of mixed ancestry from Europe, Asia and Khoisan 
people who originally inhabited the Cape region. While the idea of reified racial terms 
is extremely problematic, these terms are still used in social science literature to talk 
about the very real socio-economic differences between different populations in South 
Africa created under apartheid, and for this reason, are used within this thesis as well.  
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addition to the traditionally marginalized nature of those living in Cape Town’s 
townships, has further fuelled discontent, most notably in protests for short-term service 
delivery (Turok & Watson, 2001).  
 
When forced migrants arrive in Cape Town, ready to settle down, earn a good wage and 
find a peaceful place to live, they do so alongside many South African citizens who, 
more than twenty years after the end of apartheid, continue to be economically 
disenfranchised themselves. How migrants cope with this wealth and spatial disparity, 
and how they relate to South Africans that are disenfranchised like them, is examined in 
detail in Chapter 5.  
 
1.6.3 Migration to South Africa 
As the only country on the continent to undergo significant industrial growth and 
development, migration to 
South Africa has changed since 
the end of apartheid in 1994. 
There has been an increase in 
temporary (regular and 
irregular) cross-border 
movement to South Africa and 
from its neighbouring 
countries, and South Africa 
attracts many economic 
migrants from across the 
continent (Massey, 2006). 
South Africa has also become a 
destination country of asylum for asylum seekers and refugees from range of countries, 
predominantly in Sub-Saharan Africa. As a dominant regional economy, South Africa is 
Figure 22: Map of South Africa and region, © OpenStreetMap 
contributors 
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the heart of a new ‘migratory sub-system’, which draws migrants from across the 
continent into South Africa (Massey, 2006: 57). As such, South Africa’s own path to 
democracy and a more racially equal economy is tempered by the challenge of 
accommodating the many migrants that move to the country’s cities both for economic 
and other reasons. This is exacerbated by the fact that Southern African borders are 
long, lightly policed and, because of their relatively recent colonial origins, have little 
cultural meaning or significance for those living near them (Crush, Williams & 
Peberdy, 2005). 
 
When considering South Africa’s current migration situation, it is important to 
understand its history of migration. More than 150 years ago, in the diamond mines of 
Kimberley, South African migrant workers were joined by men recruited from the 
countries now known as Lesotho, Zimbabwe, Mozambique and sometimes Tanzania. In 
1886, gold was discovered in the Witwatersrand, and even more cheap labour was 
imported, in order to work the mines and farms of the growing settlement (Crush, 
Jeeves & Yudelman. 1992).  This discovery forever changed the pattern of migration in 
the sub-continent, creating enduring forms of legal cross-border migration in the region 
(Crush, Williams & Peberdy, 2005).  
 
By 1994, black foreigners who wanted to work outside of the mining and agricultural 
sector in South Africa were finally eligible to do so (Crush & Ramachandran, 2010), 
and so, along with newly mobile black South Africans, were able to settle in the now 
desegregated areas of the cities. Since then, migration to South Africa has become 
increasingly urbanized. While some migrants still work in farms near the border and in 
gold-mining towns, the urban agglomerations of Johannesburg, Durban, Cape Town and 
Pretoria attract the majority of migrants (ibid). Long-standing patterns of circular 
migration continue, but there has also been a growing trend in South Africa of cross-
border migrants staying for longer periods of time, and creating chain migration by 
establishing transnational households (Landau, 2008:35). 
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The end of apartheid in 1994 led to South Africa finally becoming a signatory to the 
1951 Geneva Convention. In conjunction with the shifting political and social situations 
in neighbouring countries, this has led to many forced migrants coming to the country to 
seek asylum. In the 1990s, unrest and war in Mozambique and Angola was the main 
origin of refugees. More recently, the main countries of origin for forced migrants are 
Congo-Kinshasa (i.e. DRC), Somalia, and Zimbabwe. While exact numbers are difficult 
to obtain, the United Nations High Commission for Refugees has recorded 309,616 
refugees and asylum seekers living in South Africa (UNHCR, 2013). These numbers 
have swamped South Africa’s refugee determination system.  There are about 300,000 
claimants of which only 65,668 are recognized refugees, while 243,948 are asylum 
seekers awaiting determination (UNHCR, 2015). Demographically, asylum-seekers 
come to South Africa for strategic reasons, including a desire to avoid living in camps 
or being restricted to non-urban, rural areas (Landau, 2008:34). The stress placed on the 
refugee determination system, and the resulting chaos in South Africa’s migration 
management, is discussed in Chapter 3, along with its implications for forced migrants’ 
livelihoods.  
 
1.6.4 Xenophobia  
This influx of cross-border migrants must be considered alongside the mobility of South 
Africans themselves. Many South Africans, living in the inner-cities and informal 
settlements of South Africa’s urban centres, are themselves transient or newly arrived, 
and may not necessarily feel more of a sense of connection to the city than the non-
citizen migrants who live among them. Added to this, while regarded as a land of 
opportunity for many on the continent, South Africa remains the country with the 
highest wealth disparity in the world. Many of the challenges that forced migrants face, 
such as securing formal employment, dealing with crime and securing financial credit, 
are challenges faced by poor South Africans as well. This can cause poor South 
Africans and non-citizens to see each other as competitors in the scramble for scarce 
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material resources and economic opportunity. This is a tension that has been identified 
as one of the driving factors behind xenophobia (Dodson & Oelofse, 2000). Xenophobia 
is a term that refers to an intense and sometimes irrational dislike of outsiders, and is an 
integral part of the vocabulary used to discuss citizenship and belonging in 
contemporary post-apartheid South Africa. For migrants living in South Africa, 
experiences of xenophobia are a defining factor in everyday life that affects all aspects 
of day-to-day existence (Crush et al., 2008; Dodson, 2010; Matsinhe, 2013).   
 
The problem of xenophobia in South Africa, although discussed academically as early 
as 1998, has gained particular relevance since the violent riots and xenophobic attacks 
in May and June of 2008, which started in Alexandra township in Gauteng Province and 
spread across formal and informal settlements in major cities across the country, 
including Cape Town. These riots involved mass looting and the destruction of foreign-
owned shops and homes. Sixty people were killed and over a hundred thousand people 
were made homeless (Dodson, 2010; Friebel et. al., 2013; Matsinhe, 2013). These 
attacks, in addition to violent killings by public stoning and immolation, shocked the 
world and South Africans alike. They cast a shadow even today; amongst forced 
migrants participating in this study, the events of 2008 were often used as a signpost in 
recounting their own experiences in South Africa, and held an understandable 
significance in their narratives of belonging. For their part, many South Africans made 
frequent reference to Mandela’s anticipated death as a possible trigger for a second 
round of attacks, an event that did not come to pass.  In January and February 2015, 
another spurt of violence, also targeting foreign shopkeepers, broke out in parts of 
Gauteng’s Soweto township. This violent outbreak of looting was sparked by the fatal 
shooting of a 14-year-old boy who was caught stealing from a Somali operated spaza5 
shop (Al Jazeera, 2015).  Looting and riots have spread across Soweto, with Somali, 
Ethiopian and Pakistani owned shops being targeted. In addition to the considerable loss 
                                                          
5
 The term spaza shop is a commonly used in South Africa to refer to an informal 
convenience store. 
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of income by the destroyed shops, one Somali shopkeeper in Bloomberg was set alight 
by a petrol bomb (Mail and Guardian, 2015). Such tragedies, and the underlying tension 
they reflect, have become characteristic of the broken relationship between foreigners 
and South Africans in South Africa’s townships.   
 
Such is the force in the public imagination of these attacks that the academic interest in 
topic of xenophobia in South Africa has since grown across a variety of different 
disciplines. There is a rich vein of academic writing which debates the origins and 
causes of the 2008 attacks, and similar outbreaks of xenophobic violence. But, as 
Dodson notes, while the xenophobic attacks of 2008 were deeply concerning and 
problematic, ‘they should not have struck anyone as a surprise’ (2010:4) as violent 
encounters against foreigners had been well documented in the years leading up to the 
attacks (c.f. Mattes et al. 1999). Indeed, it was not the attacks themselves that were 
unanticipated, but rather their intensity and scale (Crush et al, 2008).   
Migrants in South Africa live under a near-constant threat of violence of various types 
and degrees. While most participants spoke of comparatively non-threatening 
experiences of xenophobia – such as being referred to as makwerekwere6  or being 
threatened in joking tones, the impact of these experiences is amplified by fears of more 
severe attacks, which can financially cripple targeted shop-owners. This threat, and the 
general climate of hostility that many participants reported as their own experience, has 
led many migrants to develop a series of coping mechanisms, which will be described 
and explored in Chapter 5.  
   
                                                          
6
 A term used to derogatorily refer to speakers of non-South African languages. 
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2. Methodology 
 
2.1 Introduction 
 
The main findings for this thesis are drawn from interviews with thirty-two refugees and 
other forced migrants who live and earn a livelihood in the Cape Town area. While by 
no means intended to be a representative sample, effort was made to include a range of 
participants, with the eventual sample representing the six different countries of 
Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC) (18), Zimbabwe (5), Somalia (4), Congo-
Brazzaville (2), Malawi (1) and Nigeria (2). In order to qualify for the study, 
participants had to be over 18, engaged in non-formal or non-regular work, self-identify 
as a forced migrant, and feel, for their own security, that they had had to emigrate.  
Although their precise legal status was not determined, owing to its obvious sensitivity, 
all identified themselves as forced as opposed to voluntary migrants. Respondents 
included recognized refugees and formal asylum-seekers as well as migrants outside the 
formal asylum and refugee determination system.  These interviews were augmented by 
key informant interviews (5) with refugee service providers and visits and group 
discussions with community ethnic organizations.  
 
This chapter is divided into three main sections. The first details the epistemological 
and methodological foundations of this study. The second contains a description of my 
study design, including sections detailing selection criteria, sampling and the interview 
process. The third section discusses the relevant research challenges and ethical issues, 
and ends in discussing my analytical processes in writing the thesis.   
 
2.2 Epistemological and Methodological Foundations  
 
Research in the field of migration studies adopts a wide range of theoretical, 
methodological and disciplinary approaches, leading to intense and extensive debates. 
This is articulated in the South African context by Jacobsen and Landau (2003), who 
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call for an empirical and scientific approach to the subject, critiquing many of the small-
scale projects on forced migration as haphazard and unrepresentative (2003). The more 
quantitative, larger scale, survey based research, such as the research provided by the 
Southern African Migration Project, has obvious benefits and produces a great deal of 
information that is useful in understanding the bigger picture of migration in the region. 
Yet despite the study of South Africa being ‘awash with statistics’ (Seekings, 2006: 1), 
data regarding how many migrants live in South Africa has been described as ‘scanty, 
patchy and skewed’ (Blaser & Landau, 2014: 15), mostly due to the country’s 
inadequate data collection systems (Crush, 2011).  
 
In partial reaction to this sentiment, Matthew Sharpe (2012) and Graeme Rodgers 
(2004) amongst others have highlighted that within the field of migration in Southern 
Africa, the majority of research has indeed been large scale and quantitative, and that 
there has been a dearth of qualitative case studies on migrants in South Africa (Rodgers, 
2004). In response to this gap, and recognizing that ‘people are the experts in their own 
lives’ (Boyden & Ennew 1997: 73) this thesis uses qualitative methods, in the form of 
semi-structured, in-depth interviewing, in order to recognize forced migrant 
experiences.  In executing my study, I was influenced by feminist discussions of 
methodology (Kobayashi, 1994; England, 1994; Sundburg, 2003; Sharp, 2005) that 
argues that collaborative and personal relationships between researchers and the 
communities they study can strengthen research and produce valid, co-constructed 
knowledge.  
 
Another key aspect of a feminist approach is the idea that research is not neutral, and 
positionality is a key consideration. Fieldwork is ‘embodied, messy and complex’ 
(Sharp, 2005: 305). Who we are, and what we look like has an important and key role to 
play in determining the kind and quality of information we as researchers receive 
(2005). In this spirit, the following is a brief description of my personal and academic 
background. I first visited Cape Town as a visiting student at the University of Cape 
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Town in 2010. While I did not complete any formal fieldwork on the topic of migration 
and xenophobia, my time in South Africa awakened me to some of the challenges that 
African migrants living in Cape Town faced. When I returned to my undergraduate 
studies at Mount Allison University, I decided to focus my Honours thesis on the 
contribution that women made to the liberation struggle, and the representation of their 
experiences in South Africa’s Truth and Reconciliation Commission. These two 
experiences awoke me to the tremendous political and economic transformation that the 
country is currently going through.   
 
In the following year, between my undergraduate and my graduate studies at Western, I 
worked as a refugee settlement worker and human rights advocate at a Romero House, a 
shelter and community centre in Toronto. Living and working with individuals in the 
midst of major life changes made me witness to what a frustrating and bewildering 
process the Canadian refugee determination system can be. My time at Romero House 
made me aware of the interplay between institutional structures and the individual. I had 
witnessed firsthand the frustration and even despair that seemingly routine bureaucratic 
hurdles can produce, and I was eager to consider them more fully in an academic 
context. Given my previous experience and interest in South Africa, and my new 
understanding of some of the issues asylum seekers and refugees face, designing a 
research project around these two research interests, in a city I was already familiar 
with, seemed like a natural decision.  
 
In Cape Town, I was, and looked like, a ‘foreign’ researcher in almost every sense of 
the word. As a white, Canadian-born scholar operating out of a Canadian university, it 
is clear that the research I have conducted, and the data I have produced, is the product 
of, and subject to the frictions of my status as an ‘outsider’. Within the context of South 
Africa, a country with a set of complicated and, to an outsider, bewildering attitudes 
towards race and social status, my position as a young, female researcher from Canada, 
working with forced migrants of variable legal statuses, ages, professions and countries 
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of origin, has meant that a high degree of reflexivity and patience have been essential in 
disentangling the web of social interaction that such research entails. In her work with 
Congolese refugees living in Uganda, Clark-Kazak writes about the mzungu7 effect. 
Because foreign researchers are seen as having influence and access to resources, 
participants and Ugandans would often treat her deferentially (2006: 30).  While this 
was not as apparent in my own research, I suspect that my status as a Western 
researcher, from a country with a highly desirable refugee resettlement program, may 
have lent me, and my research enquiries, more credibility than deserved (see 2.5).  
While the mzungu effect had undoubted positive effects for my research, my position 
may have also been beneficial for participants. Community ethnic organizations were 
eager to speak to me, and wanted to use me as a mouthpiece for raising awareness about 
what was happening to forced migrants living in Cape Town. These issues are explored 
in greater detail in section 2.4, entitled ‘Research Challenges in the Field’. 
 
2.3 Study Design  
 
Data collection for this research was divided into three different stages: semi-structured 
interviews with several key informants (5) and a range of individual migrants (32), and 
finally, visits and discussions with local ethnic organizations (5). The following section 
describes each of these stages in turn, outlining the process as well as the positives and 
negatives of each method.  
2.3.1 Semi-structured Interviews with Key Informants 
 
An important preliminary stage of my research was making contact with refugee service 
organizations operating in Cape Town.  In my first two months in the city, I contacted 
                                                          
7
 Mzungu is a Swahili word that literally translated means ‘European’, but is widely 
used to refer to all white people in East Africa.  
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ten different refugee-service and advocacy organizations8, and was able to arrange in-
depth interviews with five different organizations.  These in-depth interviews were 
designed to gain a sense of the institutional landscape as it pertains to refugees and to 
gather practical information about which, and to what extent, programs support refugee 
livelihoods in Cape Town. 
 
I found that refugee-service organizations, with small budgets and staffs, are under a 
great deal of pressure to provide for the needs of the many refugees living in the city. In 
addition, some organizations, such as The Scalabrini Centre, are frequently approached 
by students eager to interview refugees for academic credit, and are consequently 
overwhelmed. Unsurprisingly, given this fact, not all organizations were willing to meet 
with me for an interview. Despite this disappointment, the interviews I did manage to 
secure yielded extensive information on the wider official policy and political-economic 
context of refugee rights. Such interviews provided an opportunity to draw upon 
informants' expertise in the sector, which played an early role in helping me understand 
the links between government policies and the actions of individual participants.  
 
Two of the organizations I worked with, The Agency for Refugee Education, Skills 
Training & Advocacy (ARESTA, located in Athlone), and the Fundi Network, a non-
profit employment agency (in Mowbray), were integral in helping me with my data 
collection. Both organizations not only provided very helpful information in their own 
interviews, but also introduced me to potential participants, and offered their own office 
space as a safe and neutral place to conduct my interviews.  This assistance 
strengthened my research in two main ways. The first was in establishing trust with 
participants. As the majority of interviewees were located through these two 
organizations, it immediately gave me, as a researcher, more credibility than if I had 
approached participants on the street.  Staff members of both organizations seemed to 
                                                          
8
 CTRC, ARESTA, ADRO, Scalabrini, PASSOP, IOM, UCT’s  RRU, LHR, AFRISA, 
Fundi, Catholic Welfare and Development, Adonis Musati Project 
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be well liked by participants, and in vouching for me and my research intentions, they 
lent a more relaxed air to the entire process which facilitated candour. This form of 
introduction was also ideal because of its discretion. Potential participants were 
approached and invited to be involved in the research in a space that was foreigner 
positive. While on the street or public areas, a young, white woman speaking at length 
with a hawker or casual labourer may possibly expose participants to unwanted 
attention, conducting interviews in this office space gave another layer of privacy and 
discretion to the interviews. There were some shortcomings to this approach as well. 
One aspect was the relatively open layout of the Fundi office, which meant that 
sometimes there was a stream of people passing through, which could occasionally 
disrupt conversations. Additionally, given the presence of Fundi staff nearby and lack of 
privacy, participants may have felt pressure to speak positively about Fundi and conceal 
more personal details for fear of being overheard. While introductions through 
ARESTA were extremely helpful in making contact with participants living outside of 
Cape Town (that still used Cape Town services), this recruitment method may have 
biased this part of the sample towards better connected and savvy migrants already 
involved in social service programs.  
 
2.3.2 In-depth Semi-Structured Interviews with Forced Migrants 
 
The most data rich portion of the research process were the in-depth interviews 
conducted with 32 Cape Town based forced migrants, representing men and women and 
a range of neighbourhoods, livelihoods, income levels, ages, and home countries. The 
in-depth interviews were designed to meet the following key objectives: (1) to gather 
detailed information about the manner in which forced migrants in Cape Town earn 
their livelihoods; (2) to provide background information through the exploration of 
informants’ life histories, especially pertaining to their decision to leave their home 
country and how they came to settle in Cape Town; (3) to identify the factors that 
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enable and constrain the livelihoods of forced migrants, especially those engaged in 
informal or insecure employment .  
 
Sampling and Making Contact 
In order to be included in the study, individuals had to self-identify as forced, as 
opposed to voluntary migrants, and be based in the Cape Town area.  Given how little is 
known about their ‘numbers, profiles, status, location and livelihoods’ urban refugees 
are considered a hidden population (Pavanello et al. 2010: 11), and as no sampling 
frame exists from which to sample randomly, participants were chosen purposively 
through reverse snowball sampling. Participants were contacted in several different 
ways: 1) through introductions by way of Fundi and ARESTA; 2) ‘cold’ introductions 
by approaching potential participants in public spaces such as their places of work; 3) 
reverse snowball sampling from initial contacts. This process is described in greater 
detail below. Given the increased precarity of migrants, special attention was paid to 
ensure introductions and interviews were discreet and did not openly identify forced 
migrants as such to casual passers-by. 
 
In order to locate a range of participants from different countries and different economic 
niches, and to achieve a relatively equal gender balance, I used a variety of recruitment 
strategies.   Interviews with key informants at ARESTA and Fundi were essential in 
providing introductions to the first set of forced migrant participants, who were 
migrants using these organizations’ services. In order to locate the majority of the 
remaining participants, directed snowball sampling was used from this group, 
particularly to find more female participants, by emphasizing to pre-existing 
participants that I was looking for participants. This method of sampling did not pick up 
much momentum until the very end of my fieldwork, when I had already reached my 
target interview numbers. Because snowball sampling did not prove entirely effective in 
producing a diverse body of participants with different occupations, countries of origin, 
or for that matter, many women, additional participants were identified and recruited 
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through day-to-day conversations in the course of buying vegetables or artisanal crafts. I 
would take advantage of the typical small talk that ensues in such transactions to steer 
the conversation towards my research, and mention that I was looking to speak with 
forced migrants about their livelihood experiences. This was an effective strategy, as it 
allowed potential participants to reveal themselves as forced migrants on their own 
terms, by either expressing interest in an interview, or declining the invitation by 
responding or ignoring the subtle invitation. 
 
I made initial contact with participants over the phone or in person, where I could 
ensure that possible participants fit the selection criteria. Together, we would arrange an 
interview place and time in an area that was already known and considered to be 
convenient and safe by both parties. Interviews were either conducted at a café or 
restaurant, at the participant’s place of work, or in the office spaces made available by 
both ARESTA and Fundi. Interviews were conducted in English, sometimes with an 
interpreter, arranged by the participant.   
 
Inclusion Criteria 
From among potential participants, I determined which of them qualified as forced 
migrants by asking if the participants felt they ‘had to leave’ their country. This 
question was simple by design, as it invited participants to offer their own explanation 
for why they came to South Africa. In one case, this lead me to disqualify a participant 
from Cameroon who explained he came to South Africa for business purposes to ‘make 
it big’ and in several cases, led me to include Zimbabweans in the study who were 
either on visitor’s visas, or Zimbabwean Special Dispensation permits (ZDP)9, but had 
been forced to leave Zimbabwe due to the past decade of political violence, instability 
and economic crisis. Although many Zimbabweans are unable to stay in Zimbabwe 
safely, their situation is generally oversimplified, and framed as ‘economic migrants’ to 
                                                          
9
 The ZDP program lasted for four years (2010-2014), and was meant to regularize the 
status of Zimbabweans living in South Africa either illegally, or as asylum seekers. It 
provides permit holders with the right to live, work and study in South Africa.  
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South Africa. This situation of Zimbabweans in South Africa was a main reason I in 
choose to employ the term ‘forced migrant’ rather than the more restrictive term 
‘refugee’ in this study.   
 
The second aspect of inclusion was spatial. Participants had to be based in the Cape 
Town area. While I did not anticipate this being a problematic criterion, it was a term 
that had to be slightly redefined. Originally, I envisioned this to mean participants living 
in the Cape Town area, but the current bureaucratic situation caused me to revise this 
criterion. Because few social services are available to refugees in the rest of the Western 
and Northern Cape, asylum seekers and recognized refugees from both regions must 
travel to the Cape Town area in order to receive most settlement assistance, and in order 
to renew their permits at the Cape Town Refugee Reception Office. For these reasons, I 
determined inclusion on a case-by-case basis. If individuals were using Cape Town 
based support organizations, or were renewing their permits at the Cape Town office, I 
considered them to be ‘Cape Town based’. As a result, this research draws on 
interviews with participants based as far away as George – an almost five hour journey 
by bus.  
 
The third and final aspect of inclusion criteria was that participants had to be working 
outside of regular, formal employment. Due to the types of labour that most foreigners 
tend to engage in – working as hair stylists, tailors, hawkers and spaza shop owners, or 
as a part of the casual economy, this employment tended to be much more visible than 
other types of labour, and was often the easiest criteria to fill.  
 
Interview Process 
Typically, I would meet and speak with participants at least once before I returned to 
conduct a formal interview. Not only did this create a better rapport from the outset of 
the interview, but it also meant that, where possible, I could prepare an interview guide 
with some background information about the relevant participant in mind (e.g. age, 
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gender, income, place of residence, time in the country). Interviews were conducted 
using an interview guide of open-ended and adaptable questions, and for those I met for 
the first time during an interview, these questions were tailored to individual 
participants’ characteristics and circumstances as the interview proceeded.  Tailoring the 
interview guides to each participant facilitated discussion of issues that were pertinent to 
his or her own experience. After preliminary questions that established nationality, 
livelihood strategy and age, the approach for the bulk of the interview was to frame 
participants’ migration experiences chronologically. This meant beginning by asking 
them about their decision to leave their home country and the process by which they 
came to South Africa. Questions gradually traced forwards in time making a note of 
changing locations, social connections and employment before arriving at the present 
day. Once the interview had reached the present time, I would then proceed to questions 
of current residence and employment.  This chronological approach proved helpful and 
effective, as it allowed participants to become storytellers who could shape the narrative 
of their experiences as migrants and refugees, rather than simply ‘interview subjects’. 
This tended to produce a more coherent narrative that contextualized participants’ 
present livelihood strategies within a wider history of migration. By the end of the 
interview, when a rapport had been established, more personal and abstract questions 
could be asked and addressed with more candour, such as their impressions of South 
Africa, their struggles in the country and their hopes for the future.  
 
While most interviews were conducted in English without an interpreter, there were 
several occasions when migrants who wished to speak to me arranged their own 
interpretation.  For those participants who expressed an interest, I was able to return to 
conduct interviews over several days, or drop by for a quick visit. This in turn produced 
a different kind of data from the once-off interviews, as a deeper relationship was built 
up, leading individuals to share detailed, useful knowledge, unique to research 
relationships built upon trust (Agadjanian and Zotova, 2012). These strong relationships 
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paid off, not only in helping with my snowball sampling, but also in leading me to 
unexpected avenues of data collection.  
 
2.3.3 Visiting Ethnic Community Associations 
The final data collection method employed was unplanned. After almost three months 
of collecting research through key informant and participant interviews, my research 
took a new turn, prompting me to include data that I recorded while attending and 
participating in ethnic community group meetings as an additional source of data. Over 
the course of my interviews and informal visits, I built a friendship with a Congolese 
family who lived in the neighbourhood where I was staying. Unbeknownst to me, the 
father, Bondeko was considered an elder amongst Congolese from eastern DRC, having 
employed and financially supported many Congolese newcomers in the ten years since 
he had come to Cape Town. I had befriended a ‘gatekeeper’ participant with a wide 
social network. Whether as a thank you for my (trying to) help with paperwork, or out 
of pure generosity, Bondeko arranged for and escorted me to meetings with five 
different (predominantly Congolese) ethnic organizations over the course of two weeks 
across Cape Town.  
 
Conversations were unstructured and guided by community leaders. Aside from taking 
notes and audio recordings, my participation was confined to asking clarifying 
questions, and suggesting new conversational directions.  Many of the individuals in 
these meetings I spoke with were highly connected with members of their own 
community, and were able to share their feelings about what should be the priority for 
refugee rights advocates. As many of the community leaders had lived in the city for 
longer periods than most of my individual participants, they had a different perspective 
to share, and were better informed about livelihood opportunities for forced migrants. 
The results of these conversations form a substantial part of Chapter 5 of this thesis. 
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2.4 Research Challenges in the Field 
 
As many participants were employed on casual or short-term work contracts, one of the 
most common problems was securing an interview time and location. As participants 
could be called in for work at any time, many interviews were arranged at the last 
minute, often on Saturdays and Sundays to better fit the work schedules of participants. 
These days were so popular that it sometimes necessitated multiple interviews in the 
same day, which was an extra strain on scheduling and conducting interviews.   
 
Another challenge was differing expectations between participants and myself. As 
forced migrants in Cape Town receive little financial support from public institutions, 
and no support from the South African government, building strategic relationships – 
either with other migrants, South Africans or researchers – is part of basic livelihood 
strategy. In such circumstances, there is a chance that researchers can raise unrealistic 
expectations of help (Clark-Kazak, 2009). I did my best to mitigate these expectations 
by explaining my position as a student and that I was there to learn and record migrants’ 
experiences. Due to the intimate nature and subject of the interviews, there were several 
occasions where current serious personal issues were brought to my attention. Given my 
outsider status in the city, without power, social networks, or organizational affiliation, 
my primary means of providing support in these situations was to listen and affirm the 
struggles that I was told about. In some cases, I was able to suggest that the participant 
access financial or job-training support through Cape Town based organizations. In two 
cases in particular, I facilitated access to mental health services and English classes. 
While I would never condone research that was extractive, participants involved in the 
study did not gain any direct benefit from participating, whereas I gained data used to 
complete my Master’s degree.  
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2.5 Confidentiality and Privacy  
 
The entire research design, from the initial stages, was planned to minimize risk and 
inconvenience to participants. At the start of each interview, a brief introduction to the 
project and its objectives was made, emphasizing the voluntary and confidential nature 
of the interview before it formally began. Oral and written explanations of the research 
and its objectives were provided to participants, but in order to maintain confidentiality, 
no names or signatures were recorded.  While Cape Town is considered a relatively safe 
city in South Africa, this security is contingent upon who you are, where you are, and 
even what time of the day it is. For this reason, a variety of strategies were used in order 
to mitigate any likelihood that speaking with a researcher would mark interviewers as 
outsiders beyond what their typical street presence in the city would have done. When 
arranging and conducting interviews, all reasonable steps were taken to ensure that 
participants were not inconvenienced and endangered.  While participants were not 
financially compensated for their time, funds were provided to cover transport to and 
from the interview site. When arranging interview times, an elaborate system of ‘missed 
calls’ was used so that I could absorb the majority of airtime costs. When, as in most 
cases, participants chose to meet in coffee shops or restaurants, I covered the cost of the 
refreshments, normally coffee or tea.  Pseudonyms are used in this thesis. All interviews 
and the resulting transcriptions have been encrypted and kept in a secure electronic 
location only accessible by me. 
 
2.6 Data Analysis and Interpretation 
 
Audio recordings or detailed handwritten notes were made while conducting interviews 
with participants, key informants and in group meetings. There were several occasions 
when participants did not wish to be recorded, and in these situations, I took shorthand 
notes, which were then transcribed into structured field notes at the end of each day.  
During more informal interactions, notes were later written from memory. All audio 
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recordings were transcribed, and these, along with field notes, were uploaded into 
NVIVO. These were then coded into basic themes such as ‘housing’, ‘finding work’ and 
‘xenophobia’. As organizing the data continued, I created more analytical nodes to 
reflect the deeper connections as they became apparent, such as ‘weak ties’, ‘strategic 
essentialism’ and ‘racial scripts’. I also tried to code and analyze transcripts with the 
eyes of a critical feminist geographer. Whenever possible, I have highlighted how men 
and women’s livelihoods are constructed differently. At times, this has been difficult. In 
the course of interviews, it was hard to introduce and maintain discussions about 
perceived gender roles and differences in households. While I sometimes observed 
gender dynamics that I viewed as problematic, this was often before or after an 
interview. Without direct participant quotes to cite, I sometimes found it difficult to 
include in my analysis in any substantial way.   In the findings chapters of this thesis, 
when possible, I use quotations from these transcriptions in order to support my 
analysis. Because interviews were conducted in participants’ second (or third, fourth or 
fifth) languages, some conversations were circuitous and it was difficult to extract tidy 
quotations. In these cases, I have summarized their words to the best of my ability, 
drawing on interview notes and transcripts. 
 
Converting the raw information into a cohesive thesis has been an emotional process. 
Many difficult memories that were shared, such as rape and violent robberies, were only 
peripheral to the central focus of the project: namely, the livelihoods of refugees. While 
there is a substantial literature detailing and discussing such issues experienced by other 
forced migrants, I still regret the fact that these experiences could not be better 
represented in this thesis.  
 
2.7 Conclusion  
My research yielded rich data that provides in-depth insight into the experiences and 
networks of forced migrants living in Cape Town. Although based on a small sample, 
and thus not strictly generalizable, their individual experiences are suggestive of 
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broader factors shaping the lives and livelihoods of forced migrants in South African 
cities. Methodologically, this section has demonstrated that investing in relationships 
with participants, and exploring their networks, can expand data collection in ways that 
were unanticipated at the outset. As presented in the three chapters that follow, 
participants’ diverse views and circumstances make the case that livelihood strategies 
are heterogeneous, yet bounded by institutional structures, social barriers and lived 
poverty. The following section, Chapter 3, will contextualise forced migrants’ 
experiences within the institutional structure of South Africa, drawing on data from 
migrant and key informant interviews, to demonstrate the ways in which these 
structures influence how forced migrant secure their livelihoods.  
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Chapter Three: ‘State’ Structures 
 
3. 1 Introduction  
 
Issues of citizenship and belonging in South Africa are right at the surface of everyday 
politics and practice, ready to be read by anyone willing to pay attention. Perhaps one of 
the clearest examples of the country’s true attitude towards foreigners is in South 
Africa’s migration bureaucracy, which, through a combination of exclusionary and 
prohibitive practices explored below, has shunted forced migrants into the narrowest 
band of livelihood options available.  In order to understand the interplay between legal 
status, formal banking and participants’ livelihood options, this section explores how 
refugees and asylum seekers in particular are excluded from the mainstream South 
African economy by the practices of the Department of Home Affairs and their 
intersection with national banking and financial services.  This chapter addresses each 
of these structures in turn, arriving at the conclusion that being outside of what Landau 
(2008) refers to as the ‘ethos of control’ in the South African system is a major source 
of difficulty and stress for participants, and thus pushes forced migrants into 
marginalized employment, either for low pay or in the precarious informal economy.  
 
3.2 Understanding the Structures of Legal Status: Obtaining Legal Asylum in 
South Africa 
 
This particular chapter, by necessity, focuses almost exclusively on the experiences of 
participants in the study who were refugees or asylum seekers.  Of the 32 participants in 
this study, six were no longer part of the asylum system, having either naturalized (1), 
attained a work permit (1) or acquired a Zimbabwean Dispensation Permit. Under these 
migration classifications, it is much easier to maintain documentation and open bank 
accounts, and so these participants’ experiences are considered in greater detail in 
Chapters 4 and 5. This section 1) sets out the refugee application process in South 
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Africa; 2) outlines legal challenges to current practice; and 3) identifies problem-points 
in the process for refugees, linking each of these factors to forced migrants’ livelihood 
practices.  
Under the Refugees Act 130 of 1998, when prospective asylees first enter the country, 
they make their initial claim at border offices such as Musina. They are then issued a 
Section 23 transit permit in order to go to the closest Refugee Reception Office (RRO) 
to have an admissibility interview. At this point, they are found either ‘manifestly 
unfounded’, or become asylum seekers, and are issued section 22 permits. After 
undergoing a second decision-making process, their claims are either rejected (after 
appeal) or accepted, and they are given Section 24 permits, which recognize them as 
official refugees under the protection of the South African state. This process can take 
many years to complete from beginning to end.  Unless refugees are able to become 
permanent residents or attain refugee identification books, they must use these permits 
as their primary form of identification. Permits themselves are physically insubstantial - 
only a single piece of paper, which visually carry little authority, and can be easily lost 
or worn down. Sometimes they are destroyed by police interested in extorting bribes 
from ‘undocumented’ foreigners (Landau 2006), increasing refugees’ precarity.   
Obtaining this legal status, and maintaining the corresponding identity permits, is 
central to refugees and asylum seekers being able to live, work and study in South 
Africa.  While the process of obtaining legal asylum is meant to be simple, asylum 
seekers in South Africa experience extreme difficulties during the application process 
(Handmaker et al, 2008; Vigneswaran, 2008). This process is managed by the 
“notoriously inefficient and corrupt” Department of Home Affairs (Hoag, 2011: 82), 
which is responsible for providing civic services to South African citizens and 
determining and administering the rights of all non-nationals to enter and remain in the 
country, including refugees (DHA, 2014). Current immigration legislation prevents 
lower-skilled African migrants from easily obtaining legal permission to stay in South 
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Africa, and so many use the heavily back-logged asylum system as a way of 
regularizing their stay (Mthembu-Salter et al., 2014).   
 
The process of applying for asylum is a complicated one, including many steps and 
hurdles along the way. The remaining part of this section is divided into three categories 
identifying and describing the main challenges participants face when applying for 
special protection in South Africa, linking each set of obstacles to participants’ struggles 
to secure their livelihood. They are: 1) backlogs; 2) lines and treatment; and 3) renewal 
of permits.  
3.2.1 Backlogs 
While DHA policy maintains that individuals with Section 22 Asylum-Seeker permits 
are to receive their status determination within thirty days after submitting their claim 
for asylum, massive backlogs of almost a quarter of a million undetermined asylum 
applications render this impossible (UNHCR, 2015; Landau in Handmaker et al, 2008).  
This backlog means that applications for asylum rarely get processed in a timely 
manner, leaving many refugees ‘stuck’ with a Section 22 permit for extensive periods of 
time, often for years. This requires frequent renewals and limits the rights that are 
afforded to the applicant (Belvedere, 2007; de la Hunt and Kerfoot 2008; Handmaker et 
al., 2008; Vigneswaran 2008).  
The bureaucratic lag continues after an asylum seeker is officially recognized as a 
Section 24 refugee, slowing access to other forms of legal documentation, like 
permanent residence and refugee identification books that carry more legitimacy in the 
South African economy. While technically refugees are able to apply for permanent 
residence, “the obstacles effectively serve as a prohibition for doing so” (Landau in 
Handmaker et al, 2008: 27). These backlogs render forced migrants unable to access 
more credible documentation or permanent residence – that would reflect their extended 
stays in South Africa, and make them more credible in the eyes of South African 
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employers. Further, while refugees are entitled to refugee ID books, the backlog on this 
processing has been so severe, that they are extremely uncommon. I did not meet a 
single refugee possessing one in my four months of fieldwork. This is problematic, as 
beyond their Section 22 or 24 permit, many forced migrants do not have official identity 
documentation, such as a passport, and so lack credibility within South Africa and are 
also unable to travel legally in the region.  
3.2.2 Lines and Treatment 
South African citizens, and those migrants with study, visitors or work permits, file 
their paperwork at the Department of Home Affairs office, conveniently located in Cape 
Town’s downtown core. While the building is crowded and the process is slow, dealing 
with paperwork as a non-forced migrant is fairly straightforward. By contrast, the Cape 
Town Refugee Reception Office is located on the edge of downtown, in a nondescript 
building in very bad repair. The first thing that is immediately obvious is the long lines 
of people waiting to be let into the building. Tourists and immigrants at the downtown 
Home Affairs office are able to take a number and sit in a waiting area to wait for their 
time to speak with an official. By contrast, refugees and asylum seekers must queue 
outside the RRO, and are only let into the building in groups of ten or fewer. These lines 
are a defining feature of the process: in order to claim asylum, the first step is getting 
into the building. Lines to access RROs are often extremely long, with hundreds waiting 
to be seen – only an estimated 30 percent of those in the line are able to speak with an 
official on their first visit (Amit, 2012). Those who are not seen by a refugee reception 
officer must either return later, risking being stopped without documentation by the 
police, or sleep overnight outside of the RRO (Vigneswaran, 2008).  
This was often spoken of as one of the most challenging parts of life in South Africa, as 
those waiting in line often have to contend with poor weather conditions, the threat of 
theft or rape, and extortion by police or security officers monitoring the lines 
(Vigneswaran, 2008). For young, single men like Yves, queuing in this weather is 
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degrading: 
In winter and its raining, you're standing outside [and] fighting in the queue... 
last time I was there for 4 in the morning until 4 p.m.  - I didn't get help. And it 
was raining. And I was like, what I am doing here?  
For other participants, particularly those with children, the experience was more 
traumatic. I met Mosi, a casual labourer and single father of 3 daughters (aged 6, 
7 and 9) in June, when he was barely earning enough to feed his children. When 
I ran into him a few weeks later, he was in even more emotional turmoil than 
when we first met. While there were several major issues going on in his life, in 
our conversation he kept returning to how, on a recent particularly chilly day 
pouring with rain, RRO officials would not allow his daughters to stand under 
the building’s overhang while he queued to have their permits renewed, forcing 
them to stand for hours in the cold rain with him. He was outraged that the 
officials would allow children to suffer like that, and compared refugee and 
asylum seekers’ treatment by officials to that of animals. 
By reason of sheer numbers, experiences like Yves’ and Mosi’s are the rule, rather than 
the exception. In one study undertaken in Johannesburg, it was common for respondents 
to return multiple times in order to have a single issue resolved, with an average of three 
visits being required (Amit, 2012). One of my research participants, Ecclesiaste, an 
asylum seeker also from DRC, reflects on the number of people waiting outside of the 
RRO in Johannesburg, in his two-month attempt to lodge a claim; 
Why wasn't it working? Because there's a lot of people, you have to be in the 
line, you have to sleep there...  you'll find people that sleep there for three 
weeks, and I did try once in Pretoria, but it was hard to get it there also. There 
were thousands of people.  
 
 36
Despite Mosi and Yves’ experiences, Cape Town’s RRO is in fact considered better 
than Johannesburg and Pretoria, and the comparative ease of filing paperwork may be a 
factor that draws some forced migrants to settle in Cape Town. Ecclesiaste remembers; 
 
I had friends, they told me, in Cape Town you can get papers easily... and I can 
get easy job…in Cape Town, the first day I come here, the next day I went 
Home Affairs and I did get my papers.   
 
These issues, and particularly the long wait times, are attributed to a combination of 
corruption and lack of capacity of the various RROs (ibid). It is obvious that it is not 
only the amount of time it takes to begin a claim or to renew a permit that is the issue. 
Participants made clear that they felt that their treatment at the RRO is degrading and 
sometimes dehumanizing, and in some cases it was obviously a source of deep 
emotional pain. This came to a head in the middle of my fieldwork, in a series of violent 
confrontations between Home Affairs officials and migrants at RROs. In late May 2013, 
security officials outside of the Cape Town office physically beat, pepper sprayed and 
used stun grenades and a fire hose over three days to control a crowd of approximately a 
thousand attempting to renew their permits (Amnesty International, 2013).   
 
All participants’ voices shared in this chapter have been male. This is because there was 
a gendered dimension to these protests, and to the DHA experience overall. A survey 
administered by ACMS researchers, across four RROs (Cape Town, Musina, and two in 
Pretoria), found that 70% of those using RROs are men, while only 30% are women.  
Outside of the RRO in Cape Town, refugees are divided into two lines according to 
gender10. This gender division was noted by male participants. As Ecclesiaste recounts: 
 
                                                          
10
 While I never found an official reason for this divide, it was suggested that this may 
be because the men were seen as too violent, and were pushing in front of women in the 
line.   
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Imagine, I come from Swellendam11, just to come to Home Affairs. It's raining 
[hard] like this, you are in the line, and then they just get women inside, they get 
the paper, but you men, you must go. The time is finished, you stay there in the 
morning, you stay there from 6 o’clock [a.m.] to 5 [p.m.], there is nothing. I 
really don't know how many woman they take, But woman, they can come any 
time, they get papers, but men, they have to stay in the line.   
 
Despite the fact that the men’s line is always much longer, in the week leading up to 
May’s events only women and children had been allowed inside the center, causing 
increasing anger and anxiety amongst male asylum seekers and refugees, many of 
whom had had their permits expire while waiting (Amnesty International, 2013).  While 
this thesis demonstrates that female participants face a series of hurdles that few male 
participants do, such as lesser ability to borrow money or maintain wide social 
networks, in legal paperwork they seem to have a slight advantage. While women also 
waited in lines for hours, and are undoubtedly also mistreated by an unjust system, they 
did not share stories of the same magnitude. While the ACMS study is thorough in its 
investigation of migrant experiences of RROs, their data is not gender disaggregated. In 
light of my findings and the cause of the May 2013 events, I suggest that more research 
into the gendered experiences of the asylum system in South Africa may produce 
interesting results.  
 
3.2.3 Renewing Permits and Employment 
For those who already have documentation, renewing documents is also a lengthy 
undertaking.  While the DHA specifies that Section 24 permits be renewed every two 
years, and Section 22 each year, agents working at the RROs continue to specify one to 
three month renewal periods for the Section 22 permits, regardless of a lack of 
legislation prescribing the validity period for the permits. Such short renewal intervals 
                                                          
11
 Approximately two and a half hours away by bus.  
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require those holding such permits to leave work frequently, often for several days at a 
time. This is particularly cumbersome for refugees living outside of Cape Town whose 
claim is lodged at the Cape Town RRO. Refugees told me about their high transport and 
lodging costs, and reported acquaintances who had travelled from as far off as Port 
Elizabeth in order to renew their paperwork. Amongst my participants, at one time, 
Somali spaza shop owner Mahmoud had to travel all the way from George every three 
months in order to renew his permits. 
Like many, Ecclesiaste’s troubles from constant renewals spilled over into his 
employment.  He received a spate of short permit renewals: “they give me just three 
months, two months, last past month, they give me two days, four days, one week, one 
month. And then after that one month.”  He knew that his frequent absences at work 
made him seem less dependable and more demanding to his employer: ‘every month 
you have to tell them 'I'm going to Home Affairs, I'm going to Home Affairs' and they're 
telling you ‘no’’. Currently waiting for an appeal of his negative asylum decision, 
Ecclesiaste has spent parts of his time in Cape Town undocumented. He explained that 
when his boss called him into work on the days he had off, under threat of losing his 
job, he opted to work, rather than wait to get his papers renewed: 
For extension, you don't get your paper, they tell you have to go home.  Then 
you're working, sometimes they [RRO] call you, but you have to go to work. But 
if you stay for a week [at the RRO], you don't go to work, you don't eat. You 
have to pay rent, and rent here in Cape Town is so expensive. If you don't work, 
they [landlords] chase you out.  
Fearful of losing his employment, Ecclesiaste chose to let his paperwork expire. Not 
only could he be jailed or deported if discovered, but it is also an expensive problem to 
fix: 
If your paper expired more than a week, you have to pay a fine. I did stay two 
years with my paper [expired]. [I was] looking for that two thousand five 
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hundred [Rand12] to be able to pay. I did, last year, I paid that money. I fixed my 
paper. Because I can't work without the paper.  
Amongst others, the above accounts of both Mahmoud and Ecclesiaste overwhelmingly 
link the access to legal paperwork with participants’ livelihoods. For self-employed 
small business owners like Mahmoud, the time spent in line represents lost revenue 
because he is not there to open his shop. For those seeking to work for an employer, or 
in the casual labour industry, waiting in line impedes their efforts to find jobs, and 
endangers employment they have managed to secure, making them less desirable as 
they appear to be less dependable and available to work. As demonstrated by 
Ecclesiaste, such frequent renewals and the long wait to receive them may force some 
employed migrants to choose between renewing their papers or keeping their jobs. The 
legal precariousness caused by such frequent and time consuming renewals detracts 
from the little currency that Section 22 and 24 permits hold with South African 
employers. What is more, it impinges upon refugees’ abilities to find formal 
employment, by engaging permit holders in a constant cycle of queuing and waiting, in 
order to maintain their legal right to reside in South Africa. As the following section on 
access to formal banking notes, these issues bleed into other aspects of refugees’ lives, 
and infringe upon their ability to participate fully in the formal South African economy.  
3.3 Access to Formal Banking 
Since 2010, with a change in banking legislation, bank accounts can be opened in South 
Africa without the green bar coded identity document held by South African citizens 
and permanent residents (FICA, 2010). For refugees and asylum seekers, this FICA 
amendment, which appears progressive and useful on paper, has been stymied by the 
continuing requirement of a valid Section 22 or 24 permit to open a bank account. By 
binding access to formal banking so closely with migrants’ legal status, the problems 
                                                          
12
 At the time of fieldwork, the conversion rate between the Canadian dollar and South 
African Rand was 10 ZAR to 1 CAD. 
 
 40
that migrants experience at RRO offices in obtaining and renewing their permits trickle 
down into their access to banking, making opening a bank account difficult, time 
consuming, and in some cases, virtually impossible. This section describes how this 
process works and what makes it particularly difficult, and then explores the main 
livelihood implications of this issue. 
 
3.3.1 Opening an Account 
In South Africa’s official regulatory process, if refugees and asylum seekers wish to 
open an account, Section 22 and Section 24 permit holders must come to a bank with 
their official permits and proof of residence. Before the bank account can be opened, 
applicants must obtain a form from the bank, which they must then take to the 
Department of Home Affairs for the purposes of verifying that the applicant is 
legitimate.  The form is then left at the DHA, and eventually mailed or faxed back to the 
bank branch where the applicant has begun to open their account. While the DHA 
claims that this process takes around two days, this is impeded by the same challenges 
at RROs listed above, and in reality often takes several months before the banks receive 
verification from the DHA13. For this reason, only those who are extremely determined 
to open an account are able to do so. Amongst my group of participants, those with ZDP 
papers, and two Congolese men were the only people with accounts.  
 
The bank account, once approved, is linked to the expiration date on the permit, and it, 
along with any assets in the account, is frozen one month before the next expiry date of 
the individual’s permit. This process, onerous in itself, is compounded by the short 
renewal periods that Section 22 permit holders receive, making it nearly impossible for 
asylum seekers with short renewal periods to maintain a bank account (Hoeflich, 2014).  
Once an account has been closed or frozen, a time consuming, Kafka-esque process is 
necessary in order to open it again. Ecclesiaste’s story demonstrates the process: 
                                                          
13
 This process was explained to me by participants, and by key informants at both 
UCT’s Refugee Rights Unit and ARESTA.  
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E: I did have a bank account, but, they did close it because my paper expired for 
two years.  I did have money inside, but the bank closed it. At Home Affairs I go 
to pay 2500 rand, I did have a bank account, FNB, I put money inside my bank 
account. I did use a card. By then, my paper was already expired. I go to the 
bank, they tell me I have to fix my paper, I have to pay again 2500, pay in Home 
Affairs. After two years, the time I go to pay that money, I go there with my 
bank, they don't recognize, the bank account is already expired.  
 
MN: How much money was in there?  
 
E: 2,300 [rand].They tell me that money did finish with monthly fees and bank 
fees. And then the bank closed it. I wanted to open another account. They said 
they can't. So now? I don't have a bank account. 
 
The most common response to these challenges is through evasion. The majority of 
participants, those who worked in the cash and informal economies hawking and 
trading, artisans and hair stylists, did not need an account, and therefore avoided it. But 
some participants, particularly those involved in casual or temporary employment, 
including those at Fundi, needed access to the formal banking system. In response to 
this need, participants used a series of tactics and strategies in order to perform 
necessary banking activities, which are further detailed in Chapter 5.  
 
3.3.2 Implications of Lack of Access to Banking 
Lack of access to banking has non-monetary costs as well as livelihood implications.  
Work on forced migrants’ access to financial services has not been substantially 
updated since 2005 (cf. Jacobsen 2005, Jacobsen & Bailey, 2004), and focuses on the 
link between exclusion from banking and opportunistic crime.  Criminals know that 
foreigners have irregular access to banking and so choose them as targets, knowing they 
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are more likely to be carrying cash (Jacobsen & Bailey, 2004). Criminals are not the 
only ones who take advantage - law enforcers have also been known to target migrants 
for arbitrary arrest based on the assumption that they might not have status in South 
Africa. Police, also aware that non-nationals have difficulty opening bank accounts, 
deliberately hassle migrants because they know they are more likely to get a bribe out of 
a migrant (Landau, 2008). 
 
There are other costs to being excluded from banking which can also insidiously affect 
the stability of participants’ livelihoods’ in the long term.  Lack of access to banking 
impedes participants’ ability to be paid for their labour, build their credit scores and 
access loans; it also prevents them from presenting themselves as fully included in the 
local and global financial economy.  These frustrations and lost business opportunities 
represent an incalculable economic and social obstacle, and were explained to me most 
clearly by a Congolese couple who had been living in the Western Cape for over a 
decade. Together they opened and operated a well-located and profitable hair salon in 
central Fish Hoek, where in addition to themselves, they employed two staff members. 
Through a series of savvy business operations, they have been able to open a second 
business, a convenience store next to the salon.  Although they have been able to build  
two profitable, brick and mortar shops, because of their refugee status, and ‘personal’14 
bank accounts they are unable to get a home mortgage, which in turn, makes it 
impossible to buy property. 
 
Instead of buying a house, which would enable them to provide a home for their five 
children while building their equity and renting out additional rooms for a profit, they 
are forced to rent, struggling to find a landlord willing to rent to a large, non-South 
African family. The couple compared continually paying rent on a month-to-month 
basis to ‘pouring your money into the ground’.  
 
                                                          
14
 Refugees and asylum seekers are not eligible to open business bank accounts.  
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This connects to a wider point about how those in the informal economy manage their 
assets – which is to say they keep it in material goods, rather than cash. To an outsider, 
it may seem like small business operators, such as spaza shop owners and the couple 
above, are wealthy because their businesses are well-stocked and well-run, but this is 
often far from the truth. In reality, for many, these shops represent all of their savings, 
or are even bought from loans. Ali Mohamed, a Somali spaza shop owner operating out 
of Mitchell’s Plain, explains this misconception: 
 
"AM: if they see Somalian, they think they've got money…[but] if you sell 
sweet and …small groceries… you can get per month, … two thousand or three 
thousand. Then, early in the morning, you wake up, you try and buy some stock. 
The people, they see this money and they think that you've got a lot of money."  
 
Now, consider the current socio-political climate in South Africa, and the fact that in 
both 2008 and 2015, xenophobic attacks and looting were directed at foreigners and 
foreign operated businesses, which completely destroyed targeted shops. While South 
Africans or permanent residents are able to convert their wealth into real property, 
forced migrants can either deposit it into a bank account, which they may have trouble 
accessing at a later date, or invest it back into their business – which, given the 
likelihood they will be targeted for robberies or, in extreme cases, looting, can create its 
own risks. Considered alongside the prospect of a house, an asset with a steady value, 
the asset range that forced migrants have in which to invest their capital is confined and 
precarious.   
 
3.4 Conclusion 
In this chapter I have discussed the system of regulations that determines forced 
migrants’ access to both legal status and formal banking opportunities. The Department 
of Home Affairs’ extensive backlog of applications, long line-ups and too-frequent 
renewal periods negatively affect participants’ abilities to obtain and retain 
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employment. These difficulties in maintaining legal status trickle down, affecting 
participants’ abilities to maintain sustained access to formal banking. Together, these 
twin institutions preoccupy participants’ time, ensuring that they lose value as potential 
employees and become more appetizing targets for opportunistic crime. This, paired 
with a disinclination on the part of many employers to hire foreigners, ensures that 
forced migrants are pushed to the margins of the South African economy, and 
compelled to engage in low paid, precarious work or enter into the informal economy. 
A description of the nature and types of this work, including the various sectors 
participants from different countries of origin engage in, is the focus of Chapter 4.  
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Chapter 4: Refugees and Asylum Seekers in Cape Town’s Informal Economy 
 
Madeleine Northcote and Belinda Dodson15 
 
4.1 Introduction  
Refugees and asylum-seekers who come to South Africa from elsewhere on the African 
continent engage in a number of different occupations and forms of employment in 
order to earn a livelihood.  Although some are in formal employment, many earn their 
living in insecure, informal employment -- such as casual labour in construction or 
domestic service -- or through entrepreneurial activities as traders, artisans or providers 
of various personal services.  Refugees and registered asylum-seekers are legally 
permitted to work in South Africa, but even with valid documents, formal employment 
is difficult to secure given prevailing anti-immigrant attitudes and South African 
employers’ suspicion of documents such as asylum-seekers’ permits, as discussed in 
Chapter 3  (Handmaker et al.  2008; Landau & Wa Kabwe Segatti, 2009). Forced 
migrants thus commonly resort to marginal informal economic activity such as street 
trading, tailoring and the creation and the sale of curios and beadwork, often in co-
ethnic networks. Forced migrants’ livelihoods commonly straddle, and indeed 
challenge, the division between formality and informality.  We find that many migrants 
combine formal and informal employment, or use gains from one to attain entry into the 
other.  For some, working in the informal sector can be a stepping-stone to more formal 
and secure employment, while for others it remains a survivalist trap from which they 
are unable to escape. Through participants’ stories it is clear that factors such as social 
support, past education, and above all gender, determine which sectors individuals 
choose, and their success within them. A complex amalgam of factors structures the 
                                                          
15
 A version of this chapter has been accepted for publication in a forthcoming book 
entitled Urban Informality and Migrant Entrepreneurship in South African Cities edited 
by Jonathan Crush and Abel Chikanda.  
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range of livelihood strategies available to migrants, and their choices must be 
understood within the context of personal history, local and transnational social 
connections, and the legal and political frameworks of South African society. A final, 
section of this chapter discusses the effect that business robberies have on migrant 
businesses, as well as on the physical and emotional well-being of the Somali traders 
affected. 
 
4.2 Migrants’ Livelihoods 
Amongst the forced migrants interviewed for this study, four broad categories of 
occupation were identified.  First, there is employment as casual or day labour, notably 
in construction and gardening for men and domestic work for women. Second, there are 
various forms of trading and hawking, from roadside stalls and itinerant trading to more 
fixed establishments known as spaza shops. Third, there are various forms of 
artisanship in the manufacture of crafts such as beadwork, wire and metalwork, 
woodcarvings and paintings. Fourth, there are personal services such as hair braiding 
and barbering, often to clients who are themselves migrants. The sections below detail 
each of these livelihood categories, drawing on the experiences of individual migrants 
to highlight the strategies adopted and the opportunities and obstacles encountered.  
 
4.2.1 Day Labourers and Casual Workers 
Casual labour is used to refer to informal work that is performed for an employer but 
without the rights associated with formal employment, such as sick leave, paid leave, or 
a formal contract (Devey et al.,2006). The term ‘day labour’ is used to describe a job-
seeking practice in which workers search for work on a day-to-day basis, in both the 
formal and informal sectors (Blaauw & Krugell, 2014).  These search strategies include 
posting personal advertisements on public notice boards and private mailboxes, using 
employment agencies, asking door-to-door and, most visibly, standing at roadside 
labour recruitment sites.  Casual and day labour are important sources of income for 
many South African nationals as well as international migrants. A previous study in 
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Cape Town showed that employers picking up labour at roadside sites tend to prefer 
foreign nationals (Sharp, 2012). Similarly, a study in Pretoria found that Zimbabweans, 
who on average had higher levels of human capital and English language skills, were 
able to earn more on a day-to-day basis than their South African counterparts (Blaauw 
et al., 2012). 
 
Certainly, day labour still was or previously had been a major source of income for 
many of the participants in this study.  While some were able to move from casual and 
day labour into more secure and formal employment, the ability to make this transition 
was heavily mediated by an individual’s social position. Claude, a migrant from Congo-
Brazzaville, for example, first came to South Africa as a refugee more than twelve years 
ago. Beginning by retrieving carts at a grocery store, he moved on to work as a car-
guard and eventually a security guard while going to college in Cape Town to get a 
qualification in electrical engineering.  After graduating, he began working for an 
electrical company and then eventually, through the Fundi Network, a labour 
recruitment and training organization, built an independent electrical contracting 
business. The turning point came when he was able to buy a truck: 
 
Three years ago…I had small car - and that car was giving me a lot of problems. 
And the guy said to me, ‘like this you can't make it. In order to make it, you 
must get a truck.  But to get a truck is not easy, so the money that you make, you 
must keep it away, because you are living in my place, so don't pay rent, and that 
money you can save, and then, until you can get the money that will allow you 
to buy the truck.  
 
The generosity of his friend, along with substantial remittances from family in 
Brazzaville, thus allowed him to save up to buy a truck, a key step in the transition to 
self-employment and even becoming an employer himself. At the time he was 
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interviewed, he was making use of the casual labour system to hire employees for his 
own business.  
 
By contrast, Mosi, a single father of three from Goma, DRC, had failed to secure even a 
subsistence income having arrived in South Africa in 2005.  At the time of the 
interview, he was still earning less than the bare minimum to support his family. A key 
means of survival was the generosity of fellow Congolese – one woman in particular 
allowed him and his young daughters to live with her family and contribute what he 
could to the rent whenever possible.  He continued to have little success obtaining 
formal employment based on his office work experience. Furthermore, the casual jobs 
he did obtain as a painter, also through the Fundi Network, never translated into longer-
term projects.  Since painting is a job that utilises common skills, he competes with a 
large pool of applicants for each job. Painting is a low-paying occupation – at R250 per 
day compared to an electrician or carpenter’s R350 per day.  Finally, as a refugee from 
war-affected eastern Congo, Mosi had endured considerable trauma in his personal life, 
having lost most of his immediate family in the DRC to a combination of war and 
illness.  The effects of this loss, paired with the added strain of caring for his young 
daughters, caused him extreme mental anguish, which undoubtedly interfered with his 
ability to find and secure work. 
 
Raphael, a 28-year-old participant from Kinshasa, DRC, had come to South Africa just 
a year previously in 2012, with only a basic understanding of English. He occasionally 
received remittances from his sisters, who live in Europe, in the form of cologne, 
electronics and cash. When he was first interviewed, he had steady employment through 
the Fundi Network as a painter and general labourer, and attended free English classes 
in the afternoons at a local refugee aid organization. In the following year, he went 
through a series of jobs but in an upward trajectory. He began working in a private 
security firm, which eventually led him to a hospitality-training programme.  He was 
able to do the programme because the owner of the house where he worked as a security 
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guard gifted him a lump sum of R1500 for tuition, an amount he would have had 
difficulty in obtaining otherwise.  That programme resulted in him finding work as a 
waiter in a high-end restaurant in Cape Town’s Southern Suburbs where he had been 
fully employed for several months. 
 
Joy, a twenty-year-old mother from eastern DRC was one of the most precarious 
labourers interviewed in this study. A survivor of rape while still in the Congo, she 
came to South Africa to join her sole remaining family member, and now supports her 
two-year-old daughter out of the money she earns working two days a week as a 
domestic worker in Woodstock and Paarl, each for R150 per day. She shares a room in 
a rented apartment with eight other individuals and pays rent monthly.  Unlike the 
previous male respondent with three children, she did not receive much support from 
community members in looking after her daughter.   This difference in community 
support may be gender based – while single parenting as a father is seen as an 
aberration, hers, despite resulting from an unwanted pregnancy, does not.  A sentiment 
expressed by many of the Congolese women interviewed was that ‘to be a woman, you 
have to learn how to suffer.’  The lack of support had a direct effect on her employment 
prospects. At the time of the interview, she had recently turned down a job in a 
restaurant washing dishes because transportation and child-care costs would have 
outweighed the additional income.   
 
What these individual stories illustrate is the considerable heterogeneity of experience 
amongst this group of ‘refugee’ labourers.  While two were able to build and then 
leverage their social and kinship networks financially, and successfully move from 
insecure or undesirable work into more secure and higher earning jobs, the others have 
so far been unable to move beyond casual, low-status employment, and seem trapped in 
precarious labour.  Those who arrived in South Africa without dependants, and were 
well-educated, urban and middle-class could draw on family members for financial 
support.   Each had also a ‘lucky break’ through a generous friend or employer 
 50
providing a ‘rent holiday’ or financial assistance for skills development or business 
investment.  The others lacked the same social capital or connections that could provide 
a launching point into formal employment.  Further, there is a clear gender bias in how 
success is attained.   In contrast to the casual jobs that the men were able to secure, 
work as a domestic labourer was comparatively socially isolating for the woman 
involved.  Male participants commonly worked as part of a team, such as on a 
construction site, thereby allowing them to build their language skills and open up a 
web of possible social and business connections. Domestic labour such as washing 
dishes, doing laundry and cleaning homes do not offer these same possibilities.  
Particular home country experiences are also an important consideration, as some had 
experienced severe personal trauma related to the conflict in eastern DRC. Although the 
stories above are all drawn from refugee narratives, casual labour is therefore used by 
individuals to varying effect, based upon the other resources on which they are able to 
draw. The evidence suggests that it can, in conjunction with social capital, individual 
ambition and sheer good luck, act as a stepping stone to more secure, formal 
employment. 
 
4.2.2 Hawking and Trading: Street-Side Stalls to Spaza Shops 
 
Perhaps the most visible livelihood strategy in which migrants engage is hawking and 
various forms of street-side selling. This is undertaken either on foot or out of stalls that 
line roadsides carrying heavy pedestrian traffic, such as near taxi and bus ranks.  
Passers-by have access to a series of hawkers’ stands that sell an ever-changing 
combination of sweets, cigarettes, and fruit and vegetables, as well as cosmetic and 
hygiene products, clothing and shoes.  Artisanal craft traders operate from various sites 
including traffic intersections, tourist destinations, or in markets that have themselves 
become tourist destinations such as Greenmarket Square, located in downtown Cape 
Town. Another common migrant trading enterprise is the ‘spaza shop’, the small 
convenience store found in informal and low-income residential areas of South African 
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cities.  These forms of retail activity are variously complementary, collaborative, or in 
competition with those of South African nationals.  This has sometimes made the 
migrants targets of xenophobic violence (Crush et al., 2008; Charman & Piper, 2011, 
2012; Gastrow, 2013).  Other constraints include the pressure to remit money to family 
members in their countries of origin and the extra time required to keep their refugee 
papers and asylum-seekers’ permits up to date. As with the casual labour livelihoods 
described above, factors such as family relations, gender roles and sheer good (or bad) 
fortune also affect the success or otherwise of their businesses.  
 
Outside a Shoprite supermarket in Mowbray – a neighbourhood near the University of 
Cape Town – are a series of hawker and vegetable stands.   Angela and Priscilla, two 
Zimbabwean women in their late twenties operate vegetable stalls, and were doing a 
brisk trade during the early afternoon when they were interviewed.  Their livelihoods 
are based on low-margin trading: buying bunches of various greens for six rand and 
selling them for seven, thus making a one rand profit on each transaction. Because the 
margin is so slight, ensuring a high number of sales each day is crucial. As one 
explained, ‘when you don't open, you lose money.’   The need for a high daily sales 
volume is threatened by the bureaucratic requirement for refugees and asylum-seekers 
to return regularly to the Department of Home Affairs where they initiated their claim in 
order to renew their permits. The length of time between renewals depends on to the 
individual case, and can range between one day, in extreme cases, to just once a year, as 
determined at the discretion of the immigration officer. The majority of participants 
renewed their papers every two to six months. This has a serious impact on income 
earning, as each day spent queuing at Home Affairs means a day not spent working, and 
thus not earning any income.   The two women also spoke about the long hours, high 
expense and hard labour involved in acquiring their produce: a twice-weekly event 
which involves travel by train, bus and by foot in order to transport the sizable bags of 
greens back from the local markets in Ottery and Epping to Mowbray. Both women had 
found their vendor locations through word-of-mouth networking, and rental of the space 
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was managed through verbal agreement with the ‘owner’ of the space, who rents the 
space from the city in his name. They stored their produce nearby which, along with 
rental of the space, cost them R550 every month – a considerable amount, given that 
each woman estimated she only made R2,000 after expenses each month. 
  
Asked where they would like to be in five years, both women said they hoped to be 
doing something other than selling vegetables – although it provided an income, it was 
not a ‘good job.’ For many migrants, running a marginal stall or a shop is still 
preferable to being an employee. Angela had left her previous job working at a 
guesthouse in order to deliver and look after her second child and was optimistic about 
her new trade as a vegetable seller: 
 
Here is better… it’s better to get my three hundred or two hundred a day… than 
to get three-fifty a week… they don’t want to increase the money –that’s why 
this is better for me. 
 
The freedom of self-employment is compromised by the inherent uncertainty of running 
a business. While earning two or three hundred rand a day may seem to be a healthy 
income, day-to-day income fluctuates widely. Most participants highlighted that at the 
beginning of the month, when paycheques are received, sales are high and business is 
good, but by the end of the month, when earnings have been spent, sales taper 
downward until the next month’s pay period.  
 
The need to work, in order to survive in South Africa but also to remit money home, is 
an intense pressure that trumps everything else. An illustrative example is Fowsiyo, a 26 
year old Somali woman, who sent her young son back to Somalia so that she could open 
up a shop and start remitting money to relatives: 
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[My husband] told me, you can't work if you have a small kid – you can't work 
outside [but] he doesn't have enough money to give me – he's paying rent, and 
then he's paying pampers, milk, food.  Whatever he had he gave me, but I don't 
have money to send to my family, and so the family suffered in Somalia. I sent 
[my baby] to Somalia. My baby is now staying in Somalia.  My mom took the 
baby and then I can work hard. I'm a strong woman, I get everywhere to buy 
stuff, I have money to survive, and then I will rent house.  But now I am living 
in only room, by myself. 
 
The pressure to support her family in Somalia, including her mother and eight younger 
siblings, was sufficient for her to ignore cultural expectations that a young mother 
should stay home and care for her children and instead open up a shop.  Her decision 
came at a price.  Not only was her young child back to Somalia, but her marriage 
eventually ended over continued disagreements between her and her husband over her 
decision to work.  Her situation not only demonstrates the strongly gendered ideas about 
work and social roles in many migrant communities, it shows the significance that 
migrants attach to earning sufficient income to remit money back home.  This is 
something for which they are prepared to endure considerable personal sacrifice and 
self-exploitation.  
 
Her hard work and entrepreneurship were evident as she described how she had built up 
her business from a R3,000 investment given to her by her husband by buying and 
reselling items in the Bellville business district, gradually expanding the scale and scope 
of her trading: 
 
 I asked him for R3,000 and I bought socks, sunglasses, and earrings, and then I 
put them in big plastic [carton] outside in the taxi rank, in Bellville.  People 
come and say ‘Hey, how are you’ and picked earrings and sunglasses.  With the 
small money I got, I made this stand.  And then when I made a stand, I bought 
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two tables, and put them this side.  And then I worked and got enough money - I 
put in clothes, I put this side jackets, this side clothes.  It is now three years 
[since I started the business].  
 
In economic terms alone, she might be considered a refugee success story. Another 
successful entrepreneur was Joyce, a Congolese woman who makes her living operating 
a small grocery stall in Cape Town’s main bus terminal, where she had been selling for 
over ten years.   Unlike the others, who sell local produce, Joyce sells imported food 
products from the DRC. Though her trade is based on selling foreign goods, she 
acquires her stock through an in-country process whereby money changes hands (via 
intermediaries) several times in South Africa before the products reach her shop. This is 
noteworthy for two reasons.  Firstly, a variety of individuals are employed in South 
Africa in transporting the goods; and secondly, she is not overtly competing with South 
African counterparts, as they are unlikely to sell Congolese products.  
 
One major form of competition between foreign traders and their South African 
counterparts is for physical space in trading sites, whether formally or informally 
managed and controlled (Hunter & Skinner, 2003).  This scramble for space emerged 
again and again in the interviews with hawkers and traders.  One extreme example 
concerns a young Somali woman named Fadumo, who was working as an itinerant 
clothes seller.  Because she could not secure a permanent place to sell her goods, she 
was travelling between Cape Town, Port Elizabeth and Johannesburg and walking door 
to door in Somali neighbourhoods in order to sell clothing, finding places to stay as she 
went.  This competition did not sit well with all participants. Joyce noted with some 
resentment that South Africans get preferential access to the City's trading sites in Cape 
Town's bus terminal. The difficulty of accessing retail space not only happens in the 
central business district, but also in neighbourhoods outside of the city core.  One spaza 
shop operator in Mitchell’s Plain, Ali Mohamed, described how his rent continued to 
rise as his landlord threatened to find a new tenant who was willing to pay more.  
 55
 
Most of the individuals engaged in street and spaza shop trading can be classified as 
survivalists rather than successful entrepreneurs. Their businesses have low market 
entry costs, but also low profit margins, and very little possibility for significant growth 
or advancement.  Family networks can be both an asset and a liability, supplying start-
up capital but also pressuring them to remit money which they might otherwise save or 
reinvest in their business. Although some respondents had managed to establish 
themselves with a degree of long-term security, the livelihoods of many remained 
highly precarious despite their hard work and considerable personal sacrifice, often at 
the cost of a stable family life and their own personal safety.  
 
4.2.3 Artisans, Wireworkers and Artists  
 
The artisan industry, which caters primarily to tourists visiting Cape Town, is an 
important form of self-employment amongst migrants (Visser & Rogerson, 2004).  
Amongst the items associated with this form of business are wire-beaded and 
metalwork sculptures, animal carvings and wooden utensils, and various kinds of art, 
including paintings as well as potato-print and tie-dye cloth, which are made and sold 
for a profit.  This informal industry, which clusters geographically around tourist 
attractions, includes a diversity of actors from a range of different countries.  Certain 
sectors are associated with particular nationalities. The local cost and availability of 
materials, which can differ significantly between cities, also affects artisans’ choice of 
media.  In Johannesburg, Zimbabweans are known for their stone and wood sculptures, 
which are carved from materials sourced in Zimbabwe. In interviews, Zimbabwean 
artisans explained that due to the geographical distance, while working in Cape Town, 
they choose to specialise in wire and beadwork, as the materials are easier to source, 
and the margins are greater.  
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The artisanal craft trade is complex, with a series of internal rules and conventions.  As 
with street traders and hawkers, space is at a premium and competition fierce. 
Newcomers have to fight and negotiate in order to gain a place on the street to sell their 
goods, a process that can take several weeks or even months. Crafts-sellers range from 
individuals, normally migrants, selling goods they have made themselves to established 
South African business owners selling bought pieces in brick and mortar shops. Some 
migrants act as intermediaries selling a variety of items, which may be locally sourced 
from artisans within Cape Town or from other artisans across South Africa and other 
parts of the continent. Several vendors interviewed for this study stated that they 
travelled back and forth, buying goods such as items made of malachite or wooden 
masks in their home countries (for example, Senegal and the DRC) and then importing 
them to be re-sold at a profit in South Africa.   
 
Two of the Zimbabwean migrant artisans in this study, Tanaka and Samuel, were 
interviewed in Kalk Bay and Camps Bay, respectively.  They had come to South Africa 
with the specific intention of pursuing their art as a business in South Africa.  Both had 
studied various art techniques in Zimbabwe and acquired these skills while still in high 
school. While these skills have translated into a steady revenue stream in Cape Town, 
both men had previously worked in other industries, and in other countries (Namibia, 
Botswana and Swaziland) before coming to South Africa. This had given them a chance 
to further improve their skills through practice and instruction from peers with more 
refined techniques.  Both men showed considerable business acumen and skill – for 
instance, by making contact with organizations for commissioned works, and constantly 
searching for new venues and outlets through which to display and sell their craft.  Both 
participants employed web searches and word-of-mouth networks in order to secure 
tables at weekly markets or larger events.  One noted that although the cost to rent a 
table at the National Arts Festival was expensive – over R4,000 for ten days in addition 
to transport and other expenses – when shared between four friends, it was ‘worth it’ 
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because of the considerable profit to be made. Samuel described how his artistic 
decisions are mediated by his business practice as follows: 
 
 I taught myself after school. [I do] paintings, bead and wire, metal…at the 
moment, I like these townships [paintings], because they're cheap, cheap 
material.  I don't buy anything, only the paint, which is very cheap, compared to 
the beads and wire, which is very expensive.  Like this [painting], the production 
cost is R5 or maybe even less but I can sell it for R80.  I would have gone for 
work in a restaurant or somewhere here in Cape Town, but art is better for me.  
 
The wire working industry is heavily male-dominated, perhaps because as Matshaka 
(2009; 73), found, amongst young men in the trade, wire working is ‘an esteemed trade, 
a masculine domain.’  Asked why the artisan trade was almost exclusively male, 
Samuel observed: 
 
 The only thing is with the craft you have to be strong.  You have to be patient - 
you sit at home, like a week, you produce, then maybe on the weekends you 
come out, you come to Camps Bay, and you don't sell anything. I've seen a lot of 
people trying to do crafts – they tried, at first they were patient, but later on, 
they're like, ‘ah no.’ And they're doing something else now. To be a crafter? 
You need to be patient and work hard. Like for me … I paint until two am, then 
I sleep maybe four hours or so, and then I get up and dry things and then I come 
here.  
 
In her fieldwork on Cape Town’s wire workers, Matshaka (2009) notes that she 
encountered only two women engaged in the sale of these crafts, but does not offer an 
explanation for this. The implication of the above quote – that women do not sell crafts 
because they lack patience and a good work ethic is disproved even within this chapter 
by the many successful female entrepreneurs interviewed. Rather, the imbalance of 
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female artisans and sellers probably has more to do with factors like the willingness to 
repeatedly approach tourists, in English, to make a sale; access to mentors willing to 
train women in the craft; and their ability to contend successfully – both verbally and 
sometimes physically – with other artisans for a space to sell their wares.  For the men 
involved, working selling wire crafts was not only a means of securing an income, but 
also a path to self-employment. One participant expressed this as the freedom of self-
determination – to decide what to sell, and when, and to not have to be beholden to a 
boss.  
 
The artisanal sector spans survivalist, entry-level participants right through to successful 
craft entrepreneurs.  In general, this sector appears to accord higher status and generate 
greater earnings relative to other forms of trading, despite having similarly low entry 
costs. Although the basic form of the artisans’ livelihood is similar to that of street 
traders and hawkers, their income is based less on numerous low-margin transactions, 
but more on a smaller number of more lucrative transactions, primarily with tourists. 
There seemed to be a wide range of income levels, but most of the artisans indicated 
that they were working in the sector because the income was steady enough to make it 
worthwhile.  It was also preferred to casual labour or even formal employment in the 
service sector.  
 
4.2.4 Hair Salons and Hair Braiding 
 
Despite the widespread presence of migrant-operated hair salons in Cape Town, as well 
as other parts of South Africa, there is very little research literature on this particular 
kind of migrant entrepreneurship.  An investigation into the types of foreign workers in 
Durban did find that 32 per cent were involved in ‘hair cutting’ as a primary activity 
(Hunter & Skinner, 2003). In areas such as Mowbray and Claremont in Cape Town, 
there are several brick and mortar hairdresser and barbershops clustered together in 
order to draw students from the University of Cape Town, as well as passing shoppers. 
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In the main minibus stations, women advertise their hairdressing services with placards 
displaying the various styles available to passing commuters. Two aspects of this 
industry make it particularly interesting: first, it offers a low-cost entry-level job for 
self-employed women; and second, it has a reputation for being a business with a high 
proportion of non-South Africans.  
 
 Many women from the DRC and Congo-Brazzaville are to be found working and 
running hair-braiding salons across the city of Cape Town. One hair salon owner, Grace 
said that when she first arrived in 2002 from Kinshasa, few South African women were 
braiding their hair at all.  As more Congolese women migrated to South Africa and 
opened shops, South African women started having their hair braided in salons.  In 
Cape Town, the hair-braiding salons represent a significant industry and source of 
income for migrant women. All the braiders interviewed for this study had non-
professional experience braiding hair before coming to South Africa, and for this 
reason, considered it a relevant job for them to undertake. With flexible hours of work, 
and the possibility of bringing their children to work with them, working as a hair-
braider accommodates women’s childcare duties better than other kinds of work.  
 
There is also a clear progression in the sector.  Hair-braiders typically begin working as 
apprentices, making an incremental amount of money to help the salon owner or other 
braiders complete a job. Despite the small amounts, this money still plays a vital role in 
some families.  One Congolese braider, Saleh, whose husband, Bondeko, had postponed 
cataract surgery until he became blind, was supporting her family of two adults and five 
children on their dwindling savings and the money she was making as a hair-braiding 
apprentice.  Although her older children mocked the meagre earnings of around R200 
per week, she pointed out to me that it was worthwhile, as she was able to cover part of 
the weekly grocery budget with her earnings.  
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After a certain amount of time, as apprentices progress, they start bringing in their own 
clients and pay commission to the salon owner. One salon owner, Janette from 
Brazzaville, Congo, tells her own story; 
 
J: For the beginning, I was working outside, for the town, to the stand. After 
that, I meet my husband here, and then my man, he was the one looked for me 
the place here because he say no, I can't working outside, because you see now, 
its winter, it’s not easy… I was working and getting just forty percent...you can 
do something for hundred Rand, the boss going to pay you forty Rand. Imagine 
for the month how much you're going to get! After that, I started to think about 
having my own place. To have also the shop here is really difficult. I learned this 
place my friend she was renting here... she told me, you cannot continue 
working for the people – you can take my place. And then I came here – since 
I'm here it’s been one year already. 
 
MN: And is business good? 
 
J: No! You know, outside earlier is not the same...sometime you get money to 
eat and pay rent, that's all. Because if you don't get money,  I [would have to] 
sleep outside…I'm a woman, I [would have to] to start to selling my body…the 
way I am here, it's better…all this place, I pay two thousand something. I live in 
that room and share another room. I'm not here alone, I have other people here 
renting [chairs].  
 
When asked how much she made from a typical job, Janette responded in a way that 
reveals how seriously she considers the livelihoods of the other braiders in her shop, 
even when her own financial situation is precarious: 
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J: It depends - you can braid for one-fifty, two hundred, some eighty Rand, 
hundred Rand. It depends what the person wants. And also, I'm not going to plait 
alone, I'm going to plait with my sisters – you need to share the money…you see 
like now, it’s quiet, no one here. Sometimes you can have customers, like three, 
four customers here, it depends. Like now it’s the month end, it's supposed to be 
busy, but it's quiet. 
 
Over the course of the interviews, it became clear that working in a salon was 
considered a ‘natural’ job for migrant women. While for the Zimbabwean male artisans 
interviewed, being self-employed was a way of publicly staking their agency through 
evident self-employment, women working as hair-braiders and running salons do not 
actively frame themselves as self-employed, but rather describe this work as ‘better’ 
than the alternative of selling their bodies. Although hard to determine if it is because of 
pre-existing cultural stereotypes or merely convenience, two separate Congolese ethnic 
organizations interviewed for this study were already either involved with or in the 
planning stages of a program that would help migrant women start their own hair 
salons. The fact that both organizations appeared to be run almost exclusively by men 
suggests that hair-braiding is seen as a job that is ‘appropriate’ for a woman – perhaps 
because it is a service that is largely performed by women for other women.  
 
Hair-braiding salons are an example of migrants employing other migrants, and an 
almost unique example of an industry where, by and large, women train and employ 
other women. As with hawking and trading, some of the hair-braiders interviewed had 
received financial or other assistance from a friend or family member in helping them 
get established, but they in turn helped others.  Based on the stories of women like 
Janette, and similarly to the experiences of traders like Joyce and Fowsiyo, it also seems 
to be an occupation in which migrants are able to achieve upward mobility, unlike the 
low-level trap of domestic service.  
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4.3 Business Robberies and Sexual Violence 
 
An extremely common theme that emerged in the study, particularly when asking 
Somali residents about their businesses, was the considerable amount of violence that 
many experience, particularly in township areas of Cape Town.  Two of the men -- both 
spaza shop owners originally from Somalia – described armed robberies that were 
considerably more violent than those related by other respondents.  Both men described 
multiple occasions when they, or those they were with, had been threatened and 
physically attacked in the course of armed robberies.  Mahmoud had large scars on his 
leg and stomach from when he was shot while operating his shop.  After being attacked 
and having the stock from his shop plundered, he was hospitalized for twenty-three days 
for complications related to the attack.  Ali Mohamed, who had previously operated a 
shop in Khayelitsha, and was operating one in Mitchell’s Plain at the time of the 
interview, had also experienced multiple armed robberies.  His shop assistant had also 
been critically wounded after having been stoned by a group of youths.  He summed up 
his experience as follows: 
 
As for safety, it is very bad in South Africa for refugees, especially for 
Somalians. If they see [a] Somalian, they think they've got money.  But money is 
very difficult – if you sell sweets and what-what, and small groceries, if you sell 
that stuff, maybe, plus minus, you can get more than R2,000 or R3,000 per 
month. Then, early in the morning, you wake up, you try and buy some stock. 
The people, they see this money and they think that you've got a lot of money  
 
Both men’s experiences reflect a common pattern in which Somali traders operating 
businesses in townships are disproportionately affected by some kinds of crime – 
particularly business robberies that include looting, arson and murder (Gastrow & Amit, 
2012).  Many migrant shop owners often sleep in their shops in order to try and prevent 
theft.  Not only is the level and frequency of such crimes alarming, it has serious 
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consequences for the livelihoods of traders.   Robberies from shops, often of cell phone 
air-time credits or other valuable items, cut sharply into their monthly earnings and 
represent a considerable strain on their livelihood.   Furthermore, given the difficulty of 
accessing the free health care to which refugees and asylum seekers have a right 
(Landau, 2006), injuries sustained while working in dangerous areas constitute a further 
financial drain on shop operators.   
 
Not only male participants are affected by the increased violence in township areas. As 
a part of a very violent society, tens of thousands of South Africans and non-nationals 
report instances of sexual violence every year. While in 2006-2007, 52,617 offenses of 
rape were recorded by the police (Rumney & van der Bijl, 2010), it is impossible to 
know how many rapes go unreported. Kihato (2007) notes that many female migrants 
do not report their experiences of sexual assault to the police because they are 
undocumented, and fearful of deportation. As a documented migrant, a young Somali 
woman, named Fadumo, was working in a clothing shop in Khayelitsha when she was 
raped by two South African men. Fearful of becoming an object of malicious gossip, 
and without family of her own to support her, she decided to remain quiet: 
 
I didn't tell anybody. If I told people, two men raped me… everyone [would say] 
‘hey, this woman, she got raped’ nobody [would] talk to me, nobody [would] 
give me something, and then, [maybe] some people [would say] ‘she sick maybe 
she got HIV’. There’s another people [that were] rape[d], and that is why I am 
scared and why I just keep quiet. 
 
Without telling anyone about what had happened to her, she left her job in Khayelitsha, 
and became an itinerant clothing seller, traveling from city to city, selling men’s 
clothing to Somali businessmen too busy to shop for themselves, and begging for 
temporary housing, normally only a day or two, from understanding Somali families 
along the way. Worried about having her secret discovered, it took over a year for 
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Fadumo to visit Cape Town’s Rape Crisis Centre, where she was able to take an HIV 
test (she tested negative). Fadumo was unable to receive counselling because she did 
not speak Afrikaans, Xhosa or English well enough to communicate with a counsellor, 
and no interpretation services were available. Fadumo still refrained from going to the 
police in order to keep her experience secret from the Somali community in South 
Africa, to protect her reputation and maintain her network of weak social ties, an 
essential part of her livelihood. While the importance of these ties is discussed in more 
depth in Chapter 5, the important point for now is the gendered nature of violent attacks 
and their social outcomes. Unlike her male counterparts, who were able to speak openly 
about the physical violence they had been victim of while working, Fadumo remained 
silent, compartmentalising an extremely difficult experience, and endangering her 
health.   
 
4.4 Conclusion 
 
This chapter has investigated various forms of livelihood practised by forced migrants 
living in Cape Town, using individual narratives to draw out the diversity of their 
experiences.  The reasons why an individual fails or succeeds involve an intersection of 
personal, structural and contingent factors.  In addition to acquiring skills, training, and 
experience, improved livelihoods frequently depend on access to social and kinship 
networks and the kindness or generosity of others, especially for establishing an 
informal enterprise and in enabling movement from informal to more formal 
employment.  Pre-migration experiences and particular family circumstances also play a 
role in determining the opportunities and constraints that migrants encounter.  Pressure 
from family members in the home country to remit earnings can impede migrants’ 
economic progress, but personal networks can also be sources of financial and other 
forms of support to engage in entrepreneurial activity in the first place.   
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Gender is another important factor. As several of the women’s narratives in this chapter 
have shown, encouragement or opposition from a spouse or other family members can 
determine livelihood pathways, and influence whether they can embark on any form of 
income-earning occupation at all. In addition, certain migrant occupations are heavily 
gendered, such as women in hair braiding and men in craft production and sales, or 
construction work for males and domestic service for females engaged in casual labour.  
Within trading and hawking activities, the women in this study were engaged in more 
marginal and less secure forms of trade, such as itinerant selling or roadside stalls, 
whereas it was men who ran spaza shops.  While this does not mean that men’s 
livelihoods are necessarily easier to secure, it does demonstrate the importance of 
gender in determining migrants’ incorporation into the labour market, whether formal or 
informal.  
 
Another conclusion from the study is that a rigid distinction between formal and 
informal ‘sectors’ is not especially helpful in understanding the livelihood strategies and 
pathways of forced migrants. Self-employment or small enterprise is a better description 
of some occupations, such as running spaza shops or hair-braiding salons.  Even the 
trading and artisanal production systems are embedded in complex procurement and 
value chains that extend beyond South Africa, intersecting with the formal wholesale 
and retail sectors in multiple ways.  Seemingly unorganized casual employment is 
connected to labour recruitment agencies and can in practice be more regular and 
‘quasi-formal’ than at first appears. What is also apparent is that refugees and other 
forced migrants are restricted in their labour options and economic mobility, whether by 
exploitative employers, bureaucratic and legal hurdles, or hostility from South African 
nationals. This matches findings from other studies of urban refugee livelihoods, both in 
other South African cities and elsewhere in the world. As Buscher (2011, p. 25) has 
concluded: ‘Regardless of the economic coping strategies employed, the majority of 
urban refugees, while demonstrating a high level of resilience, remain on the fringes of 
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the economies in which they live. For many their survival is day-to-day, hand-to-mouth 
subsistence joining the ranks of the urban poor.’ 
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CHAPTER 5: COMMUNITY CONNECTIONS 
 
 
5.1 Introduction 
 
For those working informally, the state is only ‘one candidate among many’ in 
organizing one’s economic life (Meagher, 2010). There has been an increased interest 
among academics engaged in work relating to the informal economy, in the power of 
‘social networking’ to explain economic behaviour.  This field of economics 
investigates how informal organizations and institutions based on social ties such as 
friendship, kinship, ethnicity and location, can replace the formal roles of the state 
(Totolo, 2013). Migration scholars, who have widely acknowledged the importance of 
social networking in the migration process for many years (Boyd, 1989), describe it as a 
dynamic and flexible process that can easily adapt to the host community (Castles, 
2004; Nyamnjoh, 2014). The diverse tactics that forced migrants use in Cape Town are 
excellent examples of social networking. As this chapter will demonstrate, participants 
utilize both weak and strong ties order to ensure their basic material and social security, 
and in so doing, draw upon a range of different relationships and entitlements in their 
day-to-day lives. This chapter explores the ways in which, in the context of a highly 
xenophobic environment, participants make use of these institutions and relationships, 
and argues that these strategies have significant consequences for the security of forced 
migrant livelihoods.  
 
In order to demonstrate this, the chapter is organized into two separate sections, which 
together comprise an analysis of the series of tactics participants use in constructing and 
supporting their livelihoods. Not all participants I spoke to were connected with formal 
ethnic associations or money saving groups, and so these migrants had to manage their 
money, and navigate their precarity, through more individual agency.  The first section 
explores the experiences of these participants through the series of tactics they use in 
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order to secure work, save money, find housing and gain access to banking in the formal 
economy. In the second section, I explore how several Congolese ethnic associations 
draw upon a sense of shared identity in order to manage club savings and skill training 
programs for the benefit of their members. I conclude that both individual and 
communal strategies play an important role not only in providing social support to 
forced migrants, but also in offering essential financial stability.  
 
5. 2 Individual Day-to-Day Tactics and Social Networking 
 
A high-unemployment economy, difficult access to legal documentation, and a distrust 
of foreigners and their documents amongst South Africans, together make it difficult for 
forced migrants to find work in the formal economy (Landau et al., 2005). Before 
forced migrants are able to connect with community associations, they navigate a series 
of individual challenges, including finding work, accessing banking and coping with 
meagre and irregular incomes.  This section takes an inventory of some of the most 
common and effective tactics used in order to combat these challenges. At first glance, 
these strategies may seem atomized and individual, but when considered broadly a 
pattern emerges, wherein such seemingly minor tactics and slight transgressions, 
playing on pre-existing racial scripts constitute an important set of tools that help forced 
migrants mitigate their precarity.  
 
5.2.1.Financial Literacy and Budgeting                     
 
While visiting the new home of two Congolese participants, a roomy bedroom with a 
double mattress, fridge, clothes rack and somewhat mouldy walls, I looked down to see 
several pounds of meat, mostly ribs, sitting in a box by the door. After jokingly asking if 
the two young men were planning on hosting a braai, I was informed that this meat had 
been bought in bulk for the next month’s worth of meals. This conversation about 
budgeting was one of many that I had with participants from all different backgrounds, 
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many of whom were conversant with the idea of saving money, but lacked the funds to 
do so. This following excerpt, shared by Yves, a 32-year-old single man from DRC, 
reveals the small scale at which this budgeting takes place: 
When you get a hundred rand, you know you have to eat [only] twenty rand, 
because eighty rand you must keep it for tomorrow…maybe I’ll stay two, three 
months at home again with no work. It’s up and down, up and down, that is the 
way we survive. 
 
The box of meat I had observed was the first time I had seen for myself the various 
money-saving techniques that are often used by cash-strapped households. This 
example was one of the most prevalent ways to make money stretch by buying in bulk, 
a strategy which helped to ensure household food security. Mabel, an assistant manager 
at a Southern Suburbs restaurant and mother of two originally from eastern Congo, buys 
all of her groceries in bulk at the beginning of the month. Mabel notes that living costs, 
including groceries, have increased since she arrived. In 2008 her family’s monthly 
groceries cost R500 rand; now she pays around R1,500 rand a month. Despite these 
added pressures, she and her husband, Joseph, a self-employed barber, also from eastern 
Congo, through careful budgeting, were able to stretch their income to cover the rent of 
their Wynberg apartment, (R3,800 /month), buy a car, and cover their childcare costs.  
 
 Sometimes frugality can be about more than ensuring household food security. Patricia, 
a vegetable stall operator from Zimbabwe, remits over half her income home each 
month to her parents and siblings. For her, buying only the essentials is not a mere act 
of accounting, but a way of asserting her temporary relationship with the city. As she 
told me: 
 
Us, we are foreigners, and actually we are not permanent here. So actually, when 
we are using our money, we don’t waste our money. Like, if you want to buy 
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food, you buy food at the end of the month, for the whole month...so don’t just 
go Shoprite buy, bread, no. Buy for the whole month. 
 
Budgeting is more than ensuring food security, but can also affect personal financial 
security, and make new livelihood opportunities possible. When Joseph quit his job at 
Vide e Caffe, a high-end coffee chain, because of poor working conditions and lesser 
pay than his South African counterparts, it was the R8,000 his wife had saved that 
enabled him to open a barbershop several months later. This was accomplished by 
strictly budgeting their income, a feat she had managed only by lying to her husband 
about their finances.   
 
On such small incomes, budgeting is an essential tool that can empower households to 
save for the future or start businesses. Unfortunately, financial literacy is not universal, 
and in fact, amongst urban refugees, even those operating their own businesses, levels 
of financial literacy are surprisingly low (Buscher, 2011). For Bondeko, the owner of a 
refrigerator repair shop in Mowbray originally from rural DRC, financial planning was 
not something he or his family was familiar with. Like many refugees worldwide, 
Bondeko and his family were originally from a rural area (of DRC) where they owned 
their own house and were able to farm (Jacobsen, 2005). Moving to the city, where 
budgeting to pay for rent, food and three different sets of school fees is essential, was 
something Saleh, his wife, told me they found foreign and stressful compared to their 
memories of living in the DRC.   
 
 Over the three months that I knew the family, they steadily slid into increasing 
precarity and poverty linked partially to serious illness, but also to poor financial 
planning. After running out of family savings, Bondeko was forced to sell most of their 
furniture in order to pay rent. By the time I ended my fieldwork, the family of seven had 
moved out of their apartment, and were living in the repair shop’s workspace, unsure of 
how to pay several months of back rent. At this point, like many forced migrants barely 
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surviving, Bondeko and his family would not have been able to take advantage of 
budgeting anyway, as they do not have enough cash to buy groceries in bulk or put 
away savings – demonstrating that this tactic is only useful for those with enough 
available cash to buy in bulk. While household budgeting can be a powerful tool for 
forced migrants with low incomes, there remains a divide between those who are 
financially able to budget and those who, due to unemployment, intermittent income or 
low financial literacy, cannot.  
 
For those participants able to afford it, across household composition, ethnicity and 
form of employment, budgeting earnings and food emerged as an important method of 
managing their precarious situation, and thus, at least partially, prepare for an uncertain 
financial future. While for some participants this was their primary form of ‘insurance’, 
others combined this strategy with club savings programs, discussed further in section 
5.3. 
 
 5.2.2 Smart Strategies with Banking and Racial/Ethnic Scripts 
Participants with status as asylum seekers and refugees faced persistent problems in 
opening and maintaining access to bank accounts (see section 3.5).  Whether by being 
denied permission to open an account, or having that account closed or frozen when 
legal documents expire, participants faced several serious hurdles to utilizing banking 
services.  The majority of participants dealt with this exclusion the same way that over 
25% of South Africans do – by avoiding banking altogether and working exclusively in 
the cash economy (Finscope, 2011).  
 
The motivations against banking varied amongst participants. Some did not feel the 
need to have a bank account: for small business owners, such as hawkers and spaza 
shop owners dealing in cash, banking fees signify an unnecessary expense, as all of 
their savings are converted into stock for their shops. Country of origin also plays a 
role: several Zimbabwean participants had ZDP permits, which makes it easier to open 
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an account. Other Zimbabweans in the asylum system were able to return home or remit 
money home regularly enough for a South African bank account to not be of particular 
concern.  Amongst participants, it was mainly Congolese participants (both from the 
Republic of Congo and DRC) that, due to the difficulty of remitting money home, their 
protracted time in South Africa, and the higher likelihood of working in the formal 
economy, were most interested in accessing bank accounts.  
 
In South Africa, most employers prefer to pay wages through direct deposit into 
employees’ bank accounts.  For this reason, participants working through Fundi or in 
other more formalized jobs need bank accounts in order to conduct their business and to 
be paid for their labour. Many found innovative solutions to sidestep the obstacles put in 
place by banks.  
 
One strategy particularly popular amongst casual workers for Fundi was to have office 
staff deposit their pay into a co-worker’s account.  While an elegant solution for the 
migrant employee, this approach has two main problems. The first is that it requires 
finding a co-worker who is reliable, trustworthy and willing to provide ongoing access 
to their bank account. The second is that it is cumbersome and not easily replicable. As 
a not-for-profit organization with the specific intention of easing access into the skilled 
workforce, it is within Fundi’s unspoken organizational mandate to undertake such a 
process, which normally involves multiple phone calls between different employees, 
and a good administrative ability to not confuse different people (and their bank 
accounts).  Given how cumbersome this process is, it would be difficult to find other 
organizations or employers willing to undertake this level of extra work in order to pay 
their employees.  A second tactic was much less common. One participant, Raphael, 
secured his account by asking a South African friend to open up an account on his 
behalf. This is a risky proposition, as the bank account is in the name of the South 
African accomplice, and so that person would be able to withdraw money or close the 
account without the permission of the forced migrant.  While not having a bank account 
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can hinder upwards mobility and business ventures, neither of these strategies offers a 
sustainable solution, forcing participants to rely on the charity of their employers, co-
workers or friends in order to gain access to banking. 
 
 For those with bank accounts, the account was normally seen as an asset that should be 
protected. Another, more successful and better established participant, Claude from 
Brazzaville, had opened a bank account years ago, and used it often in the course of his 
successful business as a building contractor. As a contractor, Claude needs a bank 
account in order to run his business, as it is the only way clients can deposit large sums 
of money for him to buy materials and complete his contract. For this reason, Claude 
told me he was extremely diligent in ensuring that his legal papers were up to date, and 
that he had constant access to his bank account. As a part of this, he always made sure 
to perform transactions in more affluent areas of Cape Town, where he felt he was less 
likely to have problems.  When in the bank, he ensured that he worked with either a 
coloured or white teller.  He felt so strongly about this that he would let people go in 
front of him, in order to ensure that he did not bank with a black South African teller, 
who he claimed were less lenient and patient with foreigners. Another contractor, Yves 
from DRC, admitted somewhat reticently to using the same strategy to keep his account 
open. Although he lived in Mitchell’s Plain,   
 
I only went to the Bellville bank [where he first opened his account]...what I can 
say, it's not like I'm making that thing in bad way, but it was like, [there were] 
only white people there, so it was like, easy. 
 
The tactics of these two men reflect a sentiment I heard repeated again and again by 
participants: namely, that it was specifically black South Africans (often referred to as 
‘Xhosas’, which is the dominant black African ethnic group in the Western Cape) that 
resented their presence in South Africa the most. While statistically representative 
surveys have determined that South Africans are highly xenophobic, regardless of race, 
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gender, or language (Crush et al, 2008), this issue does have nuance that cannot be 
captured in national surveys.  When describing my research to white South Africans, I 
was often told that foreigners were good workers, or worked hard, or were ‘so polite’. 
This was most memorably brought home by a conversation I had with a young, upper 
class white South African man, who commented to me there was something about 
Congolese that was more ‘sophisticated’ and ‘civilized’ than other Africans he had 
encountered. While his racist comments were supposed to support his claim that 
migrants from the DRC make particularly good waiters, his comments betrayed feelings 
I am sure not only he held: that some migrants are in some ways different or superior to 
black South Africans.  Claude and Yves, in deliberately only banking with coloured or 
white tellers, were aware of, and deliberately taking advantage of these local racial (or 
ethnic) scripts in order to further their own interests.  Indeed, amongst the Congolese 
participants I spoke with, many were aware that making a ‘good impression’ could pay 
great dividends. Based on the good impression he made on the owner of the house 
where he worked as a security guard (see 4.2), Raphael was given funds to enrol in a 
waiter-training program, and a job in a high-end restaurant upon completion. Another 
sign of this awareness is a short notice placed in a monthly Congolese newspaper, 
entitled Congo Square, which encourages Congolese to resist stealing from grocery 
stores, and instead ‘ask a brother or social agency for help’ (see Appendix A).  
 
Whether by networking strategically amongst co-workers and friends, or by taking 
advantage of the pre-existing racial scripts in their host country, migrants have proved 
resourceful in finding access to formal banking when the system seeks to exclude them. 
While some participants drew upon a series of weak ties in order to use others’ accounts 
to achieve certain objectives, other participants were able to exploit fault lines in South 
African race relations in order to open their own accounts. With this added security and 
stature, these participants were better able to start and run their own businesses, engage 
in the formal economy, and employ other foreigners as well.  In the following section, 
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the role that individual networking plays in helping newcomers integrate into the city is 
discussed further. 
 
5.2.3 Housing 
As Cape Town’s population grows, so too does competition for housing, particularly for 
low-cost housing. In addition to navigating the hyper-segregated nature of Cape Town’s 
neighbourhoods (McDonald, 2014), forced migrants enter into a competitive housing 
market, where they are forced to compete with poor locals for a place to live. They must 
do this without permanent employment, local references, or even, having just recently 
arrived, enough money for a deposit (Jacobsen, 2005: 44).  In circumstances such as 
this, social networking is a crucial tool in helping newcomers integrate into the host 
society (Massey et al., 1993) and locate housing.  Choices in housing are directly linked 
to livelihoods, not only determining personal safety, but also representing a major 
expense in migrants’ lives.  
 
The choice of where to live is among the most important decisions a migrant can make. 
Amongst participants, a significant portion had chosen to live in inner-city areas of the 
city, forgoing the significantly lower rents on offer in township areas. When asked why 
this was the case, participants would reference the townships as areas of violence.  
According to participants, townships were unsafe. Living there, they felt they would be 
more likely to be targeted for attack, based on the fact that they are not South African. 
While many participants were struggling to make ends meet financially, many placed a 
premium on continuing to live in areas that were safer – even when it meant a 
significant percentage of their overall budget. Many participants would share living 
space, bedrooms and sometimes even beds with other migrants in order to afford the 
more expensive rents (between R1,500 and R3,000 a month for a bedroom) in more 
central locations.  
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While not in any way representative, only four of thirty-two participants I spoke with 
were living in townships, despite the fact that rent can be up to ten times more in the 
city proper. During one interview, I asked two young Congolese why they chose to rent 
a single room together in Mowbray, rather than stay in a township. As a part of their 
reply, they showed me a series of graphic photos on their phones of a man who had 
been eviscerated and left for dead. While many of the details were fuzzy, they were 
adamant that this man was a foreigner, and had been killed in a Cape Town township 
for a small theft. Through a combination of word-of-mouth and mobile networks, news 
of these incidents travels quickly, and plays a motivating role in where migrants chose 
to settle in the city.   
 
All participants indicated that upon their arrival in Cape Town, they used some form of 
social networking in order to locate their first accommodation. For those who did not 
join friends or kin already living in the city, one main method of social networking, 
referred to here as ‘co-ethnic hosting’, was used. Many forced migrants used shared 
ethnicity or nationality as a conversation opener with possible other co-ethnics, in the 
hope of asking for financial support, or even for temporary accommodations.  One 
participant, a young Congolese man named Yves, describes how he used his language 
abilities to begin the lengthy process through which he secured his own housing when 
arriving in the city in 2005: 
 
 You stand in Cape Town station, there is people passing around…so you can 
see by looking the face, or what he's wearing. You just say no, this is mine. I can 
... just move on him! I say 'bonjour' when he answer you back, so you…start 
talking, you ask him; you speak Lingala? Chiluba? Swahili? …you get from 
there, start to talk, you get from him ten rand, twenty rand, to buy something. It 
took time, like two or three months, I was still with not a fixed place - staying in 
churches.  
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Since his arrival in 2005, Yves has encountered many of the most common experiences 
of forced migrants, including sharing a crowded apartment in Gardens with sixteen 
occupants, and having to move multiple times due to high rents. His past struggles 
securing housing and a livelihood have informed his current attitude towards 
newcomers as well. Remembering how hard it was for him, when asked, he hosts 
newcomers in his home in Mitchell’s Plain, a room which he shares with two other 
people. This method of co-ethnic hosting is not just limited to Congolese newcomers. 
Chiaka, a hair salon owner originally from Nigeria, was able to find housing more 
easily. Below, he explained how he found a roommate by hanging out in the Southern 
Suburb of Observatory:  
 
I was staying with my friend, he was here before me...we met on the street. 
When I spoke to him, and when he reply to me, I find that he is Nigerian guy – 
because of intonation. I say what part of you? He says he’s from Anambra – that 
is my province. I start telling him my story – that I have just come, that I don’t 
know anybody, that I’m new person here...and he say ‘okay, no problem’. As 
I’m a Nigerian, I can stay with him until I get a job.  
 
Chiaka and Yves’ stories are examples of a strategy for creating and using weak social 
ties that I heard from many different sources. But while this housing strategy had a 
worked well for men, it did not for lone female participants. In their study of the gender 
differences of Senegalese and Congolese networks, Toma and Vause (2014) found that 
unlike their male compatriots, who are able to draw on both weak and strong ties, 
female migrants rely more heavily on the strong ties of long-term migrants and family 
members in their own migration.  Sharing accommodation with relative strangers – a 
strategy used by many – runs the risk of theft and physical and sexual violence, to 
which female migrants are more susceptible (Jacobsen, 2005). These findings seem to 
hold true in the experiences of single female forced migrants coming to Cape Town as 
well.  This can lead to widely different trajectories between male and female forced 
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migrants. After her first Somali co-national host was resettled as a refugee in Canada, 
Fowsiyo, a 19-year-old Somali, was left without employment, a wide social network, or 
a strong command of English. Without viable options to secure reliable housing, she 
opted for what seemed most expedient at the time: 
 
The time she left, the lady, I got a guy, the guy told me, I will help you, will you 
marry me? And then I told him ‘Yes, I’ll marry you’. But [it was] not my choice, 
I marry because I don’t have place I’m sleeping, I don’t have money.   
 
This study found that because men had a wider range of socially acceptable housing 
options, they were more successful in finding housing than their female counterparts.  
This accords with findings by other scholars, such as Nyamnjoh’s study of 
Cameroonians living in Cape Town, who found that women’s social networks were 
more limited than men’s, reducing their access to help and support. This was certainly 
the case for Fowsiyo, who was unable to sleep on the street or live unmarried with men, 
and so secured her accommodation through marrying a man who, may have hosted men, 
but not women, out of pure generosity.  Despite being a consistent factor in women’s 
migration narratives, this gendered aspect to social networking is often excluded from 
literature on kinship networks (Nyamnjoh, 2014) and often leads to analysis that is 
‘gender blind’ (Gidengil & O’Neil, 2006:2). Taking into consideration the differing 
tactics available to both male and female participants is an important way to draw out 
the gendered implication of social networking, which can be easy to overlook if not 
directly compared. As the next section will explore more fully, men and women 
network differently in community spaces, in addition to in their individual lives, which 
has an overall effect on their (lack of) representation in these informal power structures.  
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5.3 Ethnic Community Associations  
 
5.3.1 Group Networking 
In the final weeks of my fieldwork, one of my participants, Bondeko, introduced me to 
five different community associations. Of the five groups, three of them had members 
specifically from different areas of Eastern Congo, while the other two groups included 
members from all over the DRC.  These associations, while regarded broadly as an 
occasion for Congolese to come together to socialize and network, also provide 
important social and economic opportunities to members. In addition to networking and 
money saving schemes, many associations provide access to a series of informal 
services, such as emergency medical transportation and protection, for example by 
making contingency plans for xenophobic outbreaks.  
 
Amisi and Ballard (2005) and Amisi (2005) have explored how Congolese living in 
Durban, Johannesburg and Cape Town use ethnic associations for survival. In their 
investigation, Amisi and Ballard provided a thorough political and historical context for 
the presence and function of these organizations in South Africa, beyond the scope of 
what can reasonably be outlined here. Most importantly for this thesis, they recognize 
that similar saving schemes existed in South Africa from as early as the 1930s, known 
as stokvels or ‘homeboy’ networks, and were used by rural South Africans who had 
moved to urban areas (Mamdani, 1996:193). Amisi and Ballard argue that for 
Congolese living in South Africa, this powerful survivalist tool is rooted in the DRC’s 
postcolonial history. In the DRC, citizens have coped with the decades of government 
neglect by forming grassroots support networks to provide the services that the state 
could or would not. In South Africa, Congolese refugees have recreated these 
community structures in order to establish networks of social support in their new home 
(Amisi and Ballard 2005:2). While the original function of these associations may be 
rooted in DRC’s colonial history, they take on a new meaning in the South African 
context. The structural difficulties and xenophobic attitudes towards foreigners in South 
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Africa were identified as the main motivating factors for the founding of these 
associations, stating ‘we come together here [the association] because society here 
doesn’t open up to foreigners’. Read against the feelings of exclusion that participants 
express, ethnic associations enable members to pass on cultural values to their South 
African-born children, and create a ‘home-away-from-home’ (Nyamnjoh, 2014:203).  
 
5.3.2 Group Savings 
All five ethnic associations operated basic group savings programs, which offer 
emergency funds in certain situations, and are drawn from monthly collections from all 
members. Each group meets at the end of each month, when members are most likely to 
have money. In the course of these meetings, various community issues are discussed 
and donations, determined by ability to pay, are taken for the joint fund. This process 
does not manage a tremendous amount of money – in a typical month, around a hundred 
members are able to gather between R1,500 and R3,000  This fund is then used towards 
a variety of essential payments for members, such as funerals, weddings, repatriation of 
relatives, medical emergencies, and cash support for unemployed members and 
widowed or abandoned women and children for groceries and rent.  These funds are 
crucial because, as has been demonstrated in Chapter 4, the incomes of most members 
are unpredictable and insecure. As one community member noted, in an association of 
over 120 members, ‘no one is working a good job, not a single one! No office jobs’. For 
the forced migrants involved in these associations, forming or joining a savings groups 
like this is one of the only ways of expressing agency, through mitigating their 
individual levels of precarity.  
 
While the concept of savings clubs, sometimes called ROSTAs (Rotating Savings and 
Credit Associations) is widely replicated by both internal and cross-border migrants in 
South Africa (Bähre, 2002) and worldwide (Ardener & Burman, 1995), the small loans 
that participating Congolese associations distribute are not necessarily typical across 
different ethnicities and circumstances. In her study of Cameroonians living in Cape 
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Town, Nyamnjoh (2014) finds that the ethnic associations of Pinyin and Mankon, who 
use similar savings programs to provide micro-loans to a similar number of members, 
distribute several thousand rand each month, and occasionally as much as R25,000 
(2014: 184). In contrast to my informants, who had considerably smaller businesses and 
poorer access to formal banking, the members of the groups Nyamnjoh visited had bank 
accounts both in Cameroon and South Africa, and used electronic transfers to remit 
their savings back to Cameroon, for the purposes of supporting family, aiding in local 
development projects and for financial safe-keeping in case of refoulement or 
deportation.  While for Nyamnjoh’s participants engaging in this form of banking was a 
way of protecting pre-existing assets, for the participants of this study, savings clubs 
programs were an essential part of their day-to-day financial worlds. Excluded from 
formal banking, and unable to access loans from UNHCR partners, where the process of 
getting funds is lengthy, degrading and sometimes fruitless, group savings plans can be 
a rapid and reliable way of for migrants to access a larger sum of money if needed.  
 
5.3.3 Skill Training and Employment Programs 
There are few formal opportunities for forced migrants to access financial and practical 
assistance in starting a small business or accessing employment. In the course of my 
fieldwork, I found that while organizations such as ARESTA, Adonis Musati Project 
and Red Cross all provide important short and medium term humanitarian grants to 
cover rent and school fees, none of them offer business loans or grants. Only one Cape 
Town based organization, The Cape Town Refugee Centre (CTRC) offers support, in 
the form of small grants of between R500 to R5000 (Hoeflich, 2014). The program’s 
success, however, is hindered by a lengthy intake process that takes over a year for 
participants to access funds, and the lack of skill training or education about money 
management (ibid).   
 
By contrast, ethnic associations are able to provide easier to access  start-up funding and 
be more engaged and invested with the business as it grows. An example of an 
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association that has been successful is VIDEFI, an ethnic association that has launched 
successful skills training programs in aesthetics and tailoring. During the fieldwork 
portion of this research, the program was training five women in each of the two 
programs, representing three different countries, Democratic Republic of the Congo, 
Zimbabwe and South Africa, with a total of ten women in the program. Women are 
taught the basic skills behind the trades, and also develop experience selling their 
products and operating the business before striking out on their own.   
 
While other ethnic associations have attempted to emulate this model, for example by 
starting a hair salon and crèche, they have so far been unsuccessful. This is not due to 
lack of will or capability on the part of these other associations, but rather their inability 
to fulfill the legal requirements necessary to start said programs. While it remains 
unclear how VIDEFI was able to open their business bank account, it is obvious that 
their success is the exception, rather than the rule.  MUREMA for example, an ethnic 
association for Congolese members from the Maniema province of the DRC, was 
seeking funding in order to open a crèche and hair salon, but the endeavour was 
frustrated by their lack of access to formal banking.  
 
For obvious reasons, non-profit associations must conduct their affairs from business 
bank accounts in order to receive funding through grants or donations. This is an issue, 
as refugees and asylum seekers, the majority of whom are not permanent residents in 
South Africa, are unable to open a business bank account for the association.  While I 
was unable to find a specific piece of legislation that confirms the lived experience of 
multiple participants, there are several pieces of evidence that suggests that participants’ 
experiences are accurate. The first is it that it conforms to larger regulatory trends that 
address forced migrants and banking institutions. As previously mentioned in 3.4, 
forced migrants experience difficulties accessing formal banking services. In May 2010, 
South Africa’s FIC (Financial Intelligence Centre) announced that banks were not 
allowed to transact with asylum seekers based on the official permits and certificates by 
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the Department of Home Affairs, preventing many forced migrants from accessing their 
funds in pre-existing accounts (Lawack, 2013: 339). This decision was reversed on 
September 9th 2010, when Lawyers for Human Rights, along with the Consortium for 
Refugees and Migrants in South Africa brought an application to the high court in 
Johannesburg, who successfully argued that permits from DHA be considered 
acceptable identification (ibid). While currently these permits are accepted as identity 
documents, under the 2010 regulations to prevent money laundering, FICA seems to 
empower individual banks to determine whether or not individual migrants pose a 
financial risk.  The second piece of evidence is forced migrants’ general difficulty in 
opening up even individual bank accounts, despite their legal right to do so. The reasons 
for this difficulty may be banks refusing to take on the risk of migrant accounts, as 
demonstrated in the letter from First National Bank (FNB) officials to ARESTA (see 
appendices).  Finally, the online application for a business account with FNB, the bank 
considered one of the most likely to provide formal banking to migrants (UCT, n.d) 
specifically notes that ‘FNB must verify the identity of all persons defined by the FIC 
Act as Related Parties before any account may be activated’ and that the person opening 
the account ‘must be a South African Resident and have a green-bar-coded RSA ID 
book’16.    
 
Given how few Congolese have been able to naturalize or obtain permanent residence, 
and certainly do not have green-bar-coded RSA ID books, it is unlikely that MUREMA, 
and other groups like them, will be able to access private funding through grants for 
grassroots initiatives. This banking barrier against opening business accounts represents 
a lost opportunity not only for entrepreneurs hoping to open or expand their businesses, 
but also ethnic associations and non-profits that hope to create social enterprises that 
could benefit the wider community. This roadblock signifies a loss to the South African 
citizens as well as forced migrants.  In the spirit of Landau’s call for programming that 
                                                          
16
 Sourced from the First National Bank website at 
https://www.fnb.co.za/Sales/main.jsp accessed April 1, 2015.  
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moves away from ‘bespoke’ programming exclusively for refugees (2014: 143) some 
migrant associations are already providing services to interested South Africans, 
including VIDEFI’s tailoring training program and the business skills workshops 
offered by the Somali Association of South Africa (SASA) located in Bellville (Daily 
Maverick, 2015). Not only do these programs provide economic opportunities to 
individuals in need of assistance, but they could also serve as a venue for South 
Africans and non-nationals, including forced migrants, to interact in a positive 
environment.  
 
5.3.4 Social Networking and Community Services 
The monthly association meetings enable Congolese from across the Greater Cape 
Town area to connect and network with others from different parts of the DRC. 
Through the large monthly meetings, these associations are also useful venues to access 
information about formal and informal employment opportunities (Amisi, 2005, Al-
Sharmani, 2003 and El-Abed, 2003) and important information regarding forced 
migrants’ legal status in South Africa.  Members see the association as a place to meet. 
This is particularly true for funerals and weddings, where it is expected that all 
Congolese go to pay their respects (Amisi and Ballard, 2005).  Through social 
networking, these meetings serve a larger function, in supplementing or in some cases 
even replacing the often-inadequate civil services available to migrants and South 
Africans alike.  
 
In their investigations into medical xenophobia, Crush and Tawodzera (2011) find that 
within a healthcare system that is overburdened and in an advanced state of disrepair 
Zimbabwean migrants do experience discrimination based on documentation, poor 
communication, verbal abuse and xenophobic statements and insults. These findings 
echo issues with medical services noted by participants, such as MUREMA’S response 
to the discriminatory treatment of Cape Town Emergency Medical Services. 
Participants reported that, when speaking with the dispatcher, if they had trouble 
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communicating in Afrikaans or English, dispatchers would sometimes disconnect the 
call, similar to Crush and Tawodzera’s findings that medical practitioners will 
deliberately use local languages with foreign patients, as a way of underscoring their 
powerlessness and other-ness. Participants complained that EMS had unacceptably slow 
response rates, particularly in townships, where an ambulance may not come at all, or if 
it did, only after several hours. In response, the association developed a list of members 
with cars able to provide transportation if a medical situation arises. If needed, any 
member of the association can call these numbers, and transportation will be arranged to 
bring them to the hospital. Similarly, in the course of community meetings, contingency 
plans have been made for possible future xenophobic attacks.  This process is similar, 
and involves phone trees and a prearranged action plan in order to extricate members 
from affected townships and informal settlements, all without the use of public 
transportation such as public taxis and trains.  
 
5.3.5 Gender in Ethnic Associations 
Despite one of the main stated objectives of these associations being to financially aid 
single women and children who are deemed ‘powerless’ without the collective’s 
support, women were conspicuously absent in all ethnic associations that I visited. Like 
Nyamnjoh’s fieldwork with Cape Town based Cameroonian ethnic associations, I also 
found that women were confined to ‘marginal decision making processes’ (2014: 177), 
and of the five associations, only one woman was in a leadership position, holding the 
dubious honorific of Minister of Women and Children’s Affairs. Women were also 
absent at the association’s monthly meetings. When I raised this issue, it was explained 
to me was that most female members’ husbands were also members, so the women 
stayed at home to take care of the children, who were considered too disruptive to 
attend, while the husbands attended the meeting. This heavy gender distortion not only 
places male migrants in the position of ‘helpers’ of victimized female migrants, but also 
contributes to women having less widespread and more isolated social networks, and 
hence less social mobility, than their male counterparts.   
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5.3.6 Summary 
In considering the role of social networking in forced migrants’ livelihood tactics, it is 
obvious that both individual and community networking tactics are used. Individual 
networking, typically composed of weak ties, tends to be used more effectively by male 
forced migrants, while females face a more limited set of options. Community ethnic 
associations play an important role in providing access to small and easily accessed 
sums of money that would otherwise have been unavailable to participants. Finally, in 
addition to these club savings programs, some ethnic associations are undertaking 
economic empowerment programs, intended to provide training programs for their 
members, but also available to other foreigners, as well as South Africans. Such 
organizations provide a promising opportunity to not only enable forced migrant 
livelihoods, but build positive social capital with their host society.  
 
5.4 Conclusion 
By considering the full economic lives of forced migrants, it is clear that in addition to 
the wage and income earning activities discussed in Chapter 4, the individual tactics and 
networking strategies that migrants use play an important role in securing their 
livelihoods. The strategies, such as budgeting money and taking advantage of local 
racial scripts, are an important part of participants being able to deploy what little 
money they have in the most strategic way possible.  
 
Both individual networking and interactions with ethnic associations help forced 
migrants to gain access to a series of weak ties that enable them to access housing 
opportunities, lump sums of money in emergency situations, and various kinds of skill 
training programs, as well as to network in order to gain access to a wider variety of job 
opportunities.  In addition to fostering a sense of belonging, these ethnic associations 
structure forced migrants’ interactions with each other, and act as a state-like structure 
that provides community-styled grant programs, emergency medical services, and even 
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disaster management.  At the same time, these processes and tactics are deeply 
gendered, and offer a different portfolio of options to male and female participants, 
leaving women to deal with more serious consequences due to their diminished social 
networks and marginalized positions in ethnic organizations. While such non-monetary 
tactics may, to a certain degree mitigate the considerable financial strain on forced 
migrants’ livelihoods, their position remains financially and sometimes physically 
perilous. In the words of one participant, while networking can help, for forced migrants 
with insecure employment and living in a xenophobic and sometimes violent city, ‘not 
only are you insecure socially, but you don’t know what your future holds for you’.  In 
the end, these strategies emerge only as a way of managing, rather than erasing that 
insecurity.  
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6. CONCLUSION: LOOKING TOWARDS THE BIGGER PICTURE 
 
 
6.1. Introduction 
While South Africa has one of the most powerful economies on the continent, forced 
migrants arriving in Cape Town encounter a city divided by vast income inequality, 
embedded within a country with national unemployment rates of above 25 percent. 
Unlike forcibly displaced migrants living in refugee camps and receiving humanitarian 
aid, forced migrants in South Africa must be economically self-sufficient by taking part 
in the South African economy. Despite their high rates of education rates and 
willingness to work, their access to formal employment opportunities is hampered by 
South African employers’ distrust of their paperwork and widespread xenophobia, 
pushing many forced migrants into the informal economy. In response to this context, 
this thesis set out to learn more about the economic activities of forced migrants 
working outside of the formal economy, typically through working in the informal 
economy or as casual labourers. In order to take a bottom up, people-centred approach 
that drew out individual lived experiences, this thesis drew upon a livelihoods 
framework, following in the approach of Vearey (2008) and Jacobsen (2005; 2006).  
The following pair of interlinked questions guided the research and analysis: What 
forms of informal employment or other income generating activities are forced migrants 
in Cape Town using to secure their livelihoods? and what are the economic, social and 
spatial factors that enable this employment?  
 
Using data collected from semi-structured interviews with forced migrants and key 
informants, the research for this thesis discovered that while the both disorganization 
and corruption prevalent in the Department of Home Affairs and the persistent and 
generalised hostility towards foreigners throughout South African society curtailed 
participants’ economic activities, this was mediated by participants’ drawing upon a 
series of formal and informal tactics and social relationships in order to secure their 
livelihoods. The specifics of these, along with the overarching themes of the thesis, are 
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summarized in the following section (6.1). In sections 6.2 and 6.3, I identify the 
theoretical and policy implications of these findings, before discussing the limitations of 
the study (6.4) and pointing to some areas for future research regarding the study of 
livelihoods and forced migrants living in South Africa (6.5).  
 
6.2 Main Findings  
 
This thesis has considered the livelihood strategies of 32 forced migrants working 
outside of the formal sector in South Africa. It has found that even amongst those 
engaged in informal and casual labour, a diverse range of income earning modes were 
employed. Participants engaged in entrepreneurship in sectors such as contracting, hair 
salons, spaza shops and hawking, while those engaged in casual labour secured their 
work either through the Fundi Network, or informally, through day labour or social 
networking. Those engaged in casual labour were predominantly construction and 
domestic workers. There was a marked heterogeneity of experiences: while many seem 
trapped in low level employment, others, by drawing on transnational connections, 
personal charm and luck, were able to negotiate their way into more formal (and secure) 
employment. Three cross cutting themes were identified, each of which are explored in 
turn in the following section: gender, the informal/formal divide, and instability and 
precarity.  
 
6.2.1 Gender 
Gender was a factor that structured all aspects of participants’ economic and personal 
lives, from their experiences at the Department of Home Affairs, to the sectors 
participants became involved in, to the ways and extent to which they networked. With 
separate queues for men and women at the Department of Home Affairs, despite the 
prevalence of men among forced migrants, women experienced fewer frustrations in 
renewing their permits, and reported less of an impact on their overall livelihoods and 
access to legal status. Gender also shaped the choice of participants’ income-earning 
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activities, as women were involved in hair salons, vegetable stalls and hawking, while 
men were more likely to be involved in artisan work, spaza shops and casual labour.  
This gender-influenced income earning extended into casual labour as well: men were 
able to use Fundi as well as day-labour options to secure work, while only one woman 
engaged in this form of labour, and only through Fundi. Casual labour opportunities for 
‘female’ jobs such as dishwashing and domestic work were in less demand by potential 
employers than typical ‘male’ jobs, such as painting and construction work. This made 
it more difficult for female participants to find work using this resource. These gendered 
livelihoods had further impacts on how participants networked socially.  While men 
could be hired as a part of a larger team of construction workers, which allowed them to 
network with other foreigners, as well as South Africans, while building skills by 
learning from their co-workers, women were normally registered as single domestic 
workers or administrative assistants, jobs which were less common, socially isolating 
and presented few opportunities to build skills.  Within ethnic associations, women’s 
roles were restricted to marginalized positions specifically designed for women. 
Women’s presence in meetings was sparse, as most women were tasked with caring for 
the children off-site.  
 
6.2.2 Formal/Informal Divide 
While this thesis set out to document the livelihoods of forced migrants working in the 
informal economy, my findings suggest that rigidly distinguishing between formal and 
informal ‘sectors’ may not be the most useful way of framing forced migrant 
livelihoods. Focusing on the income-earning histories of participants, starting from 
when they began their process of moving to South Africa to the present day, revealed 
that many participants moved frequently between formal and informal income-earning 
in order to earn a living. Some participants, particularly men working as casual 
labourers, sometimes work simultaneously in both formal and informal economies in 
order to make ends meet, and maximise income and networking possibilities. Income-
earning in the informal economy is subject to similar organizational rules as the formal 
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economy, in that informal processes determine access to spaces to work and operate, 
with their own hierarchies and rules. These govern migrants’ access to the space and 
opportunity necessary in order to earn income. While forced migrants may work 
casually or informally, the results of their work is a part of the formal economy, whether 
in the infrastructure built by casual labourers or in the production of the artisanal crafts 
sold in formal, brick and mortar shops.  
 
6.2.3 Instability and Precarity  
A consistent theme in conversations with forced migrants was the volatile and unstable 
nature of forced migrants’ tenure in the city. This manifested itself in several different 
ways, including accessing documentation, social services and housing, as well as in 
their income-earning strategies. As discussed in section 3.2, refugees and asylum 
seekers experience great difficulty accessing legal documentation, because of the 
disorganization and corruption at the Cape Town RRO, which results in long lines and 
inconsistent renewal periods. This puts participants’ legal status in regular jeopardy. 
While informal and casual labour is to a certain degree unstable by nature, there seemed 
to be cyclical dips in business and earnings, as many hawkers, traders and artisans have 
built a customer base which consists largely of poor South Africans, who tend to spend 
less near the end of the month. Others rely on the highly seasonal tourist economy. In 
addition, Cape Town’s xenophobic atmosphere contributes to participants’ feelings of 
being physically unsafe as they move throughout the city, which in turn shapes their 
experiences of the city, cutting them off from building social networks with South 
Africans.  While forced migrants have developed a set of tactics to address these strains 
and exclusions, such as strict budgeting and individual and community level social 
networking, these are not permanent solutions to their chronic instability. Some 
participants, such as Claude and Raphael (section 4.2) were able to mobilise local and 
transnational social connections in order to maximise their income and access steady 
employment in the formal economy. The majority of participants, however, despite 
drawing upon a diverse set of entitlements that ranged from various income strategies, 
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individual and community links and personal strategies and tactics, could do little to 
increase their overall livelihood security.   
 
The three finding chapters of this thesis have demonstrated that there is no simple 
solution to the uncertain and vulnerable situation that forced migrants find themselves 
in, but rather confirm the fact that the exclusion that participants face is 
multidimensional.  
 
6.3 Contributions to the Literature  
This thesis joins a significant body of literature that explores the livelihood strategies of 
the urban poor, as well as the literature of migrants living in South Africa, and their 
struggles to make a place for themselves in the country. It finds that there is no singular 
experience of being a forced migrant in Cape Town, and that livelihood strategies are as 
diverse as the participants themselves. In considering forced migrant access to the 
Department of Home Affairs, this study confirms the work of Amit (2012) and 
Vigneswaran, (2008) that corruption and long wait times interfere with participants’ 
access to legal documentation and formal employment. In considering forced migrants’ 
relationships to banking, this work builds on the earlier work of Landau et al. (2005), 
Jacobsen (2005) and Jacobsen and Bailey (2004). Through a fine-grained consideration 
of individual migrants’ struggles, it reveals how the new 2010 FICA regulations, which 
interlink legal status with bank accounts, limit forced migrants’ access to formal 
banking. Chapter 4 describes the kinds of trades that migrants are generally involved in, 
highlighting the hitherto under-researched role that hair salons play in how female 
migrants craft their livelihood strategies. In considering the social networks of 
participants, the findings of this thesis confirms those of Amisi and Ballard (2005) in 
their investigation of Congolese ethnic organizations, in identifying these institutions as 
important loci of social networking and informal insurance.  In contrast to Nyamnjoh’s 
(2014) investigation of Cameroonian migrants living in Cape Town, this thesis found 
that Congolese participants contributed and drew upon much smaller amounts of 
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money, but did find that, like the associations described by Nyamnjoh, there were few 
opportunities for female inclusion in leadership.  
 
6.4 Policy Implications  
South Africa’s current legal and banking structure seriously affects forced migrants day-
to-day lives, and their abilities to participate in the formal South African economy. 
While the entire asylum system needs to be redesigned, simple adaptations, such as 
setting a minimum time between permit renewals, for example a year or six months, 
instituting a numbering system for appointments, or a by-mail application submission 
system for permit renewals could create a more fluid and humane experience for forced 
migrants. This thesis also recommends that the South African government reconsider its 
banking regulations, and amend FICA guidelines to clearly state that refugees and 
asylum seekers are allowed to hold both business and personal accounts.  
 
The findings of this research have revealed interesting policy implications in regards to 
the livelihoods of forced migrants. In spite of a burgeoning literature addressing 
humanitarian action and urban refugees, there is little evidence from interviews with 
participants that such programs play a important role in how forced migrants patch 
together their own livelihoods. Indeed, as Landau (2014) suggests, humanitarian aid to 
refugees and asylum seekers that is not also available for South Africans could feed into 
xenophobic feelings towards foreigners. A closer consideration of Fundi Network's 
operating model may be able to offer insight into the kinds of structures that can 
empower migrants. Fundi deliberately designs teams that contained both South Africans 
and non-South Africans, both highly-skilled and less-skilled labourers, so that labourers 
at Fundi were able to learn from each other, and build social networks outside of their 
own ethnic affiliations.  The informal nature of casual labour allowed participants to 
arrange their time, to be able to take care of their documentation issues at the 
Department of Home Affairs without jeopardizing their employment. One serious 
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recommendation would be for Fundi to attempt to diversify its opportunities, so that 
women may also be able to take better advantage of this program.   
 
6.5 Limitations of the Study 
Drawing on a livelihoods approach, the intention of this study was to incorporate the 
perspectives of forced migrants on their own livelihoods by considering, on the one 
hand, the structural factors that shape their options, while highlighting the agency that 
participants have to actively shape their lives through material and non-material assets. 
The results of this thesis has the potential to overstate the individual agency that 
participants have to shape their lives in contexts of poverty, and I have done my best to 
evenly objectively present forced migrants’ livelihoods.  With purposive sampling, and 
a sample size of only 32 participants, ranging in profession, country of origin, age and 
gender, there is little scope to generalize these findings. In choosing respondents, there 
is a possibility of missing interesting and useful information from the individuals that I 
excluded.  With such a diversity of participants, it was sometimes difficult in analysis to 
find themes and trends across so many different factors that were meaningful without 
being reductionist.  
 
6.6 Future Research Directions  
While the field of refugee and forced migrant livelihoods offers a vast array of options 
for further research, three avenues would be particularly interesting and worthwhile.  
The first is the role that ethnic associations play in forced migrants’ livelihoods. While 
Amisi and Ballard have done an extensive investigation into the practices of Congolese 
migrants, a fuller exploration of which migrants use these networks, and how widely 
these networks are used, and by migrants from which countries, could be explored 
further. 
 
A second area of focus is women’s livelihoods, with a particular focus on the role of 
hair salons, in order to fill a gap that has not been previously explored, and in order to 
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learn more about an industry that is largely operated by women. Certain questions arise 
from a consideration of this particular industry. For instance, what are the trajectories 
and qualities of women that start these businesses? How do they raise capital to start 
these businesses, and how is this process different from that utilized by their male 
counterparts? 
 
Finally, this thesis would not be complete without a call for other migration scholars to 
take a more serious look at forced migrants’ access to formal banking. In my search for 
literature to contextualize and support my own findings, there were few studies that  
review the impact of the new regulations on forced migrants. Such a study could yield 
important information and policy recommendations Such a study should consider: How 
have the regulations changed since 2010? How many forced migrants use bank 
accounts? How many use other forms of banking? How does this affect remittances?  
 
6.7 Final Remarks 
Forced migrants come to South Africa hoping to escape the persecution and war they 
have experienced in their home countries. Upon arrival, they instead encounter a hostile 
country where the unnecessarily difficult bureaucratic structure of Home Affairs traps 
them in a cyclical quest to maintain their legal status. While most forced migrants are 
able to secure their livelihoods through a combination of formal and informal work and 
the power of social networking, few have been able to move beyond mere survivalism.  
Even those that are economically successful struggle to access South Africa’s banking 
system, and are unable to build equity in the country. These structural constraints, 
paired with widespread xenophobia and violence, inspire many participants to dream of 
ways to leave South Africa, whether by returning home, or through resettlement. More 
than twenty years after the end of apartheid, it seems that South Africa does not yet 
belong to all who live in it.  
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APPENDIX A: EXCERPT FROM CONGO SQUARE NEWS 
Août/August, 2013: 2 
  
  
TRANSLATION 
 
Alert! Alert! Alert! 
 
Asani, AMIBEK 
 
In less than one month more than four 
Congolese (DRC) have been arrested in 
supermarkets for stealing products like: 
cheese, Pampers [diapers], chocolates 
and bottles of whisky. It is true that life 
has become difficult, but that does not 
justify acts of stealing. It would be best 
to use a brother or a social service 
organization. 
 
Many of us do not know that Congolese 
(DRC) ARE AMONGST THE 
FOREIGNERS WITH THE BEST 
REPUTATION IN SOUTH AFRICA, 
according to the statistics of a group of 
lawyers who proved easily that at the 
end of the year, they had not had a case 
with a Congolese. 
 
Let’s maintain that reputation, as it can 
be used, by us and by our children born 
in this country.  
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APPENDIX B: LETTER FROM FIRST NATIONAL BANK TO ARESTA 
 
 
CONTACT INFORMATION REDACTED 
 
SIGNATURE REDACTED 
 
CONTACT 
INFORMATION 
REDACTED 
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APPENDIX C: ETHICS APPROVAL 
 
 
 
 
SIGNATURE REDACTED 
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APPENDIX D: LETTER OF INFORMATION FOR FORCED MIGRANTS 
 
Livelihood strategies of urban refugees in Cape Town, South Africa 
Principal Investigator: 
Belinda Dodson, Geography Department, University of Western Ontario 
Student Researcher: 
Madeleine Northcote, Geography Department, University of Western Ontario 
 
Letter of Information17 
 
My name is Madeleine Northcote, and I am a student at the University of Western 
Ontario in Canada. I am here in Cape Town because I am working on a research project 
about forced migrants in the city and how they make a living. This letter is meant to 
explain my research to you, including what kinds of issues we will talk about, and what 
I plan on doing with the information you share with me. This will help you decide 
whether you would like to participate. 
Cape Town has many forced migrants and refugees, and I am interested in knowing 
how these people make a living in the city, and how important self-employment is in 
this. I plan on interviewing around 30 individuals who were forced to leave their home 
country and now live in Cape Town. In order to participate in an interview, you must 
consider yourself to be someone who migrated under forced conditions. You must also  
be aged 18 or older, and make at least part of  your income through self-employment, 
for example in making goods for sale or providing a service for which you are paid.    
I would like to know what you do to make a living, what difficulties you encounter in 
these activities, and what help or support you receive from other people or 
organizations. I would also like to know what some of the biggest challenges are to 
living in the city as a migrant, and what things you do to meet these challenges. I will be 
talking to men as well as women, and I will also ask you about the different ways that 
men and women migrants make a living. 
Participation is voluntary, and you may refuse to participate, refuse to answer any 
questions or withdraw at any time. If you agree to participate, I will ask you several 
questions about how you came to live in Cape Town, your work life and your 
experiences living in the city. I hope that you will also tell me about other aspects of 
your life in Cape Town that you feel are relevant that I did not think to ask. If there are 
any questions that you do not feel comfortable answering, you do not have to. I will not 
ask for any identifying information or about your immigrant or refugee status and you 
should not tell me anything about your status that might put you at risk. If you think that 
talking to me would attract unwanted attention from other people or from authorities 
                                                          
17
 Paper copy will be provided to potential participants, and oral version will be 
read to any who are illiterate.  
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like the police, then it is better that you say no and do not participate. If you do 
participate, all your information and answers will be confidential and will be kept either 
with me or in a locked location at all times, so no-one else will be able to hear or see 
them.  
The interview should last about an hour, but you are free to end it at any time. With 
your consent, I would like to record the interview with a digital audio recorder. You can 
choose to have the recorder turned off at any stage during our conversation. If you do 
not want our conversation to be recorded, you can still participate, but I will write down 
notes to help me remember what we discussed. The only person who will listen to the 
recording or read the notes after our conversation is myself. From what I learn from 
these interviews, I will write a thesis about migrants in Cape Town. When I write about 
what you have told me, I will never use your name. I will reveal only your age, gender, 
where you come from and how you make a living and I will refer to you only by a 
made-up name. I will keep all the information on my laptop computer and only I know 
the password.  
There are some risks you should be aware of. You might lose time by talking to me that 
you could have spent working.  You can decide when it is convenient for us to talk, and 
if you want to pause the interview or must do something else while we are talking you 
are free to do so. You can choose whether we do the interview at the place where you 
work or at another place, such as at a coffee shop.  
Some of the questions may be sensitive, but as I said before, you may choose not to 
answer a question and we can move on to the next one. Also, remember that you may 
end the interview at any time. You will not benefit directly from participating in this 
study but information gathered may help to bring attention to the situation of forced 
migrants living in Cape Town, and show that they are working to look after themselves.  
After the interview, I will be happy to keep in touch and to tell you about my research 
as I make progress. You can reach me by telephone in South African at _________ or in 
Canada at ___________ or by email at _______. If you would like to know more about 
the research project, you may also contact my supervisor, Dr. Belinda Dodson, in 
Canada at __________ or by email at ________.  If you have questions about your 
rights as a research participant,, please contact the Office of Research Ethics at the 
University of Western Ontario in Canada at ___________ or ___________. 
 
Sincerely, 
Madeleine Northcote 
This letter is yours to keep for future reference. 
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APPENDIX E: FORCED MIGRANT ORAL CONSENT FORM 
 
Livelihood strategies of urban refugees in Cape Town, South Africa 
 
Consent Form 
I have read or heard the letter of information, have had the nature of the study explained 
to me and I agree to participate. All questions have been answered to my satisfaction. 
By way of stating ‘yes’ I indicate my willingness to participate in this survey. 
 
 
Yes/No 
 
 
May I continue audio recording our conversation?            Yes/No 
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APPENDIX F: QUESTION GUIDE: FORCED MIGRANTS 
 
Clarify that they don’t have to respond to any questions that make them uncomfortable.  
1. Are you over 18? 
2. Did you come to South Africa because you felt you could not continue living in 
your home country? 
3. Where are you from?  
Probe: What country were you born in? Where did you grow up? 
4. Would you consider yourself self-employed? 
5. What made you decide to move to South Africa? How long have you lived in 
South Africa? 
6. Can you tell me about how you came to Cape Town? 
7. Tell me more about how you make a living.  
Probe: What kind of work do you do? 
Probe: If they have a business: What products/services do you sell? 
Probe: How do you get your supplies? 
Probe: Where do you make most of your sales? Where do you spend most of 
your day? 
Probe: How long does it take you to get from where you live to where you 
normally work?  
Probe: Do you work on your own or with other people? Are those people also 
immigrants? Are they from the same country as you?  
8. Can you describe a typical day to me? 
9. What are the major obstacles you encounter in trying to make a living in Cape 
Town? 
Probe: Are you able to sell/work in the same place regularly? 
Probe: Is there a lot of competition for customers? 
Probe: Is it difficult to get goods to sell or money to buy stock/make your 
products? 
Probe: Is it difficult to transport or store goods or money? 
10. What are the major problems you face in day-to-day life in Cape Town?  
Probe: Do you feel safe where you work? 
Probe: Do you feel safe where you live? 
Probe: Do you feel safe using public transportation? 
Probe: Have you had any experience with authorities (either police or immigration?) 
Probe: Have you encountered any negative attitudes or hostility from South Africans or from 
other migrants? 
11. How do you deal with these challenges? Are there any people who help you? 
Probe: Do you have family in the city? 
Probe: Are there any migrant or refugee organizations you use? 
12. Do you think your experiences would be different if you were a man/woman?  
13. What are your hopes for the future? Where do you see yourself in 5 or 10 years? 
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